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Abstract 
Public opinion polls have shown the public lacks confidence in U.S. police to use 
appropriate amounts of force and treat racial minorities fairly, which undermines police 
legitimacy and the quality of life of all citizens. Although rules have been shown to 
positively constrain police uses of force, researchers have not demonstrated the effect of 
rules on racially influenced policing (RIP). In 2005, the RIP directive which prohibits 
officers from using race as a factor in taking discretionary actions was promulgated in 
New Jersey. The purpose of this study was to determine through the theoretical lens of 
Lipsky’s street-level bureaucrat theory the influence of the RIP directive on municipal 
police officer uses of force upon non-Whites. A quantitative nonexperimental 
retrospective design was used to examine a stratified, proportionate random sample of 
301 use of force reporting forms from municipal police agencies in one New Jersey 
county for a 5-year period before and after the enactment of the RIP directive. A binomial 
logistic regression indicated that the RIP directive had no influence on the use of force 
upon non-Whites. Suspect race did not significantly influence force outcomes. Scholarly 
implications include producing research based upon existing policy to better help inform 
evidence-based policymaking. Policy implications include police practitioners and 
policymakers actively monitoring officer uses of force for racial bias and broadening 
their examination to other issues affecting the problem of trust. Implications for social 
change include framing the problem within the public policy paradigm to promote 
political discourse, evidence-based decision making, and improved civilian oversight of 
the police, which could strengthen trust and police legitimacy.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study  
Introduction 
In the United States, citizens have a social contract with their government to 
protect their security. Individuals have largely sacrificed their implied right to use force 
for their protection by granting that right to the government—more specifically, the 
police—resulting in a net gain in freedom from victimization by others (Dunham & 
Alpert, 2015; Pollock & Reynolds, 2015). The legitimacy of policing is threatened, 
however, when officers misuse that authority. Recent highly publicized incidents of 
deadly force and in-custody deaths have further damaged the public’s trust in the police 
(Jones, 2015). Public policymakers and police practitioners must take steps to restore that 
trust. Such steps must be evidence-based, using the best available research to identify 
what works and the gaps where evidence is insufficient so that policies can be improved 
(Pew Charitable Trusts, 2014).  
This study was intended to contribute to the body of knowledge needed to address 
police-civilian trust by examining the influence of the New Jersey rule prohibiting 
racially influenced policing (RIP) on police uses of force. Central to this study is the 
concept of street-level bureaucrat theory (SLBT; Lipsky, 2010); specifically, the use of 
rules to constrain the discretion of public servants. The study contributes to positive 
social change by bridging the scholar-practitioner divide to provide public policy and 
police practitioners with an evidence-based assessment of the effectiveness of an 
administrative rule to prevent racially disparate outcomes within the framework of its 
implementation. In addition, the study was designed to determine the value of the New 
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Jersey RIP policy as a model to promote the equal treatment of minority populations for 
other police agencies. Further, this dissertation can serve as an example of how civilians 
can use open public records laws to gather records and provide oversight of their police 
agencies. 
In this chapter, I provide a review of this study and a background of the current 
problem, establish the purpose and nature of the study, and review the study’s theoretical 
framework. I also furnish the research question, hypotheses, and important definitions. 
Finally, I discuss the assumptions, scope and delimitations, limitations, and significance 
of this research. 
Background 
On August 9, 2014, police shot an unarmed Black teenager in Ferguson, MO, 
resulting in a wave of anger and accusations that police unfairly target racial minorities 
for unjust violence, specifically Blacks (Smith, 2016). Other high-profile incidents in the 
middle of the decade involved deadly force or in-custody deaths in New York City, 
Cleveland, OH; Bridgeton, NJ; North Charleston, SC; Baltimore, MD; Chicago, IL; and 
Charlotte, NC, prompting public calls for increased police accountability. Some groups 
demanded that police agencies be defunded by their municipalities (Smith, 2016; 
Melendez, 2016; Thrasher, 2016; U.S. Department of Justice [U.S. DOJ], 2014, 2015a, 
2015b,  2015c, 2016a; 2016b; Yan & Karimi, 2016). After each incident, protests 
materialized. Some erupted into violent riots, causing widespread physical and economic 
destruction in the local community (Bredderman, 2014; Kent, 2015; Morice, 2015; Ortiz, 
2015; Yan & Karimi, 2016). In a few cases, random officers who were not involved in 
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the original incident were assassinated by people acting out against killings by police 
officers (Carrero, 2016; Fieldstadt, 2014; U.S DOJ., 2016).   
The issue of police killings of Blacks in the United States has also drawn the 
attention of the United Nations, where a report was made to the General Assembly 
indicating, “Contemporary police killings and the trauma that they create are reminiscent 
of the past racial terror of lynching. Impunity for State violence has resulted in the current 
human rights crisis and must be addressed as a matter of urgency” (Working Group of 
Experts on People of African Descent, 2016, p. 16). The strain in the relationship 
between the police and civilians, particularly racial minorities, cannot be overstated, nor 
can the destructiveness of the social and political consequences be overlooked. 
The power of government is granted by civilians, and it does have the potential 
for abuse. But only anecdotal evidence suggests of widespread abuse of police power 
(House Judiciary Committee, 2016). Montesquieu (2011) provided an assessment of the 
corruptibility of power when he explained that experience has demonstrated that those 
with unlimited power are inclined to abuse it. This has been true in policing, such as 
when paid civil servants engaged in slave patrols to brutally enforce slave codes prior to 
the application of the 14th Amendment to the states. Other examples abound of officers 
abusing their power when using force (Fried, 1999; Sanchez, 2016). Still, these and other 
examples represent a small number of police-civilian encounters, making the claim of 
widespread abuse difficult to support. Despite the insufficiency of the evidence, civilian 
confidence and trust in the police are low (Jones, 2015).  
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Administrative rules and laws have been promulgated throughout the United 
States, prohibiting police abuses of power. The purpose of such actions is to improve 
public confidence in the criminal justice system, unify society, and foster trust and 
support for criminal justice efforts. New Jersey was the first state in the nation to outlaw 
RIP (New Jersey Office of the Attorney General [NJOAG], 2005a, 2005b). This 
prohibition is supported by criminal statutes to prosecute officers found engaging in its 
exercise (N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:30-2; 2C:30-7). Research has shown that administrative rules 
are effective in constraining many police actions (Alpert & Dunham, 1990; Fyfe, 1978, 
1979; Terrill & Paoline III, 2016). Still, researchers have not examined the ability of rules 
to eliminate RIP. This gap represents a significant gulf between researchers and 
practitioners, as practitioners must ensure the equal protection of all civilians and require 
evidence-based solutions to achieve that end. The concept of equal protection is 
paramount to citizens’ social contract with the government, and that contract is vital to 
the legitimacy of government. Through this study, I provided an empirical assessment of 
the scope of police violence during a 10-year period in New Jersey, filled the research 
gap by examining the data for evidence of RIP during uses of force before and after the 
promulgation of the RIP directive, and provided needed evidence-based information 
required by government officials and police practitioners to judge the effectiveness of the 
New Jersey RIP directive. 
Problem Statement 
In the United States, public trust in the police is waning, prompting a need for the 
government to take action to restore citizen trust. While a majority of the population 
5 
 
remains confident in the police enterprise, a substantial portion of society believes that 
police use inappropriate amounts of force and unfairly treat racial minorities (Jones, 
2015; Pew Research Center, 2015). This problem impacts all of society because it 
undermines the legitimacy and authority of the police and government, and threatens the 
quality of life of all citizens, particularly racial minorities (Mazerolle, Antrobus, Bennett, 
& Tyler, 2013; Rosenbaum, Lawrence, Hartnett, McDevitt, & Posick, 2015; Tyler, 2004; 
White House, 2016; Wolfe, Nix, Kaminski, & Rojek, 2015). Intense media coverage of 
the deaths of several Black men at the hands of police has likely contributed to this 
problem (Jones, 2015; Pew Research Center, 2015). In response, the federal government 
has recommended to all police agencies several methods to improve the public trust, 
including the imperative rule to prohibit RIP (President's Task Force on 21st Century 
Policing, 2015; Weitzer, 2015). New Jersey prohibited RIP in 2005 (NJOAG, 2005a, 
2005b). Research has shown that administrative rules have been effective in controlling 
officer uses of non-deadly and deadly force and vehicle pursuit (Alpert & Dunham, 1990; 
Fyfe, 1978, 1979; Terrill & Paoline III, 2016). However, scholarly research has not 
addressed the influence of administrative rules prohibiting RIP where implicit biases may 
be unrecognized by officers and their supervisors, and where these implicit biases affect 
official actions. This quantitative study builds upon previous studies of the influences of 
administrative rules by examining the effect of the New Jersey RIP directive on officer 
uses of force through the theoretical lens of Lipsky’s SLBT. 
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Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this retrospective quantitative nonexperimental study was to 
examine the influence of the New Jersey RIP directive, which prohibits the use of race as 
a factor in officer discretion, on officer uses of force in one New Jersey county to 
determine if the policy altered force outcomes for non-Whites after its implementation. 
This study controlled for subject, officer, and encounter characteristics found to be 
significant in the previous scholarly use of force research. The extant literature has shown 
that administrative rules are effective at constraining officer actions during critical 
incidents involving force (see Anderson, Litzenberger, & Plecas, 2002; Fyfe, 1978, 1979; 
Terrill & Paoline III, 2016). If rulemaking is effective at preventing RIP, then the 
application of force should not disproportionately impact any racial category after the 
RIP directive has been implemented. 
Research Question and Hypothesis 
I addressed the following research question in this study: 
RQ1: How did the New Jersey RIP directive affect municipal police officer uses 
of force on non-Whites after its implementation in one New Jersey county? 
Ho1: The New Jersey RIP directive did not significantly affect municipal police 
officer uses of force on non-Whites after its implementation in one New Jersey county. 
Ha1: The New Jersey RIP directive did significantly affect municipal police 
officer uses of force on non-Whites after its implementation in one New Jersey county. 
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Theoretical Framework 
SLBT provides the framework for this study. Lipsky (2010) explained that public 
servants, whom he called SLBs, played an important role in society. These public 
servants wield considerable discretion as they fulfill their official obligations (Lipsky, 
2010). They are responsible for delivering the government benefits and sanctions that 
structure and delimit the lives and opportunities of all citizens (Lipsky, 2010). Still, SLBs 
must overcome limitations in fulfilling their roles, such as ambiguous policies and 
insufficient resources (Lipsky, 2010). They may develop coping mechanisms contrary to 
established policy and which collectively embody a de facto public policy (Lipsky, 
2010). SLBT will be supplemented by the works of Davis, who examined the role of 
rules in police work. A more detailed explanation of Lipsky and Davis’s work is 
presented in Chapter 2. 
Police officers are SLBs who are governed by policies and rules, but, in some 
circumstances, a gap may exist between policies and rules and their intended outcomes. 
Davis (1969, 1975) offered a widely accepted model within the police enterprise by 
which officer discretion could be confined, structured, and checked. The New Jersey RIP 
directive and use of force guidelines conform to the Davis model. In this study, I 
examined the influence of the New Jersey RIP directive on municipal police officers’ 
uses of force. The New Jersey use of force policy has at its foundation two factors: sound 
judgment and the appropriate exercise of discretion (New Jersey Division of Criminal 
Justice, 2000). As Lipsky (2010) explained, if officers engage in RIP while administering 
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force contrary to stated policy, these actions might have resulted from stereotypes during 
the exercise of their discretion. 
Nature of the Study 
The study was a quantitative non-experiment using publicly accessible 
government records to examine the effectiveness of the New Jersey RIP directive in 
preventing intentional discrimination and disparate impact when officers use force. Using 
government records to investigate new research questions for which the data were not 
originally intended is a well-established method in social science research (Heaton, 
2004). Specifically, I used the New Jersey use of force reporting form to generate the 
data. The form is generated to memorialize in public and criminal records the actions of 
an officer each time force is used on a civilian. The reports are required by state law and 
are created under the auspices of each police agency. While the report was not 
specifically created to serve as a data collection instrument for this study, the data 
contained within is well suited to examine the research problem.  
The use of force reporting form collects data valuable to this line of research. Key 
variables captured in the form include (a) the time period, which indicates the existence 
of the RIP directive (independent variable); (b) force used by officers (dependent 
variable), and (c) the suspect’s race (independent variable of interest). Other variables I 
studied included (a) officer tenure, (b) suspect age, (c) suspect resistance, and (d) suspect 
unusual conditions. Since the RIP directive outlaws the use of race as a factor in officer 
discretion in determining how to treat people, I hypothesized that there would be an 
interaction between the existence of the RIP directive and suspect race. By examining 
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time periods before and after the promulgation of the RIP directive, my statistical 
analysis determined the influence of the RIP directive and its interaction with a suspect’s 
race on officer uses of force while controlling for suspect, officer, and encounter 
characteristics. An in-depth discussion of the academic literature supporting the inclusion 
of each of these variables is provided in Chapter 2. 
The data were collected from municipal agencies within one anonymous New 
Jersey county through open public records requests. This included all force reports 
submitted to those agencies between June 2000 and June 2010. Data from municipal 
police agencies were entered into an Excel spreadsheet and later analyzed using SPSS 
version 21. The nature of the collected data resulted in the use of binomial logistic 
regression to determine the likelihood of mechanical force and to determine if the RIP 
guideline altered force outcomes for non-Whites after its implementation. A more 
detailed discussion of the methodology and reasoning for the analysis is provided in 
Chapter 3. 
Definitions 
Constructive authority: Actions or behaviors exhibited by a police officer which 
do not involve physical contact or force directed upon a subject but which are intended to 
induce the subject to submit to the officer’s authority (NJOAG, 2000). 
Critical incidents: Sudden events that expose officers to physically dangerous 
situations perceived to be outside the officer’s control and which overwhelm an officer’s 
coping skills, causing immediate distress (Anderson et al., 2002; Evans & Coman, 1993; 
Kureczka, 1996). 
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Deadly force: Force directed upon a subject with the purpose of causing, or which 
are known to create a substantial risk of serious bodily harm (N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:3-11[b]; 
NJOAG, 2000). 
Disparate impact: The denial of benefits to an individual of a particular race, 
color, or national origin without substantial legitimate justification during the course of 
implementing a neutral procedure or practice (Elston v. Talladega County Board of 
Education, 997 F.2d 1394, 1406 (11th Cir.), reh'g denied, 7 F.3d 242 (11th Cir. 1993); 
U.S. DOJ, 2001). 
Encounter characteristics: Those features or qualities belonging exclusively to an 
encounter, such as suspect actions and charges, type of incident, and the presence of a 
weapon (Bolger, 2014; Klahm IV, Frank, & Liederbach, 2014). 
Force: Lawful physical actions undertaken by police officers to protect persons or 
property or to overcome suspect resistance during the execution of their public duties that 
intentionally or unintentionally attempt or inflict physiological harm, impairment, or 
death (NJOAG, 2000; N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:1-14[b]; 2C:3-3 et seq.; 2C:3-7 et seq.; 2C:11-1 
et seq.). 
Imminent danger: Possibility of harm” that may occur during an encounter absent 
action by the law enforcement officer”. (NJOAG, 2000, p. 4). 
Intoxication: The experience “of a substantial deterioration or diminution of 
mental faculties or physical capabilities” (State v. Tamburro, 346 A.2d 401, 68 N.J. 414, 
1975). 
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Mechanical force: Force in the form of “some device or substance, other than a 
firearm, to overcome a subject’s resistance to the exertion of the law enforcement 
officer’s authority” (NJOAG, 2000, p. 3). 
Officer characteristics: Those features or qualities belonging exclusively to a 
police officer, such as age, gender, and race (Bolger, 2014; Klahm et al., 2014). 
Police officer: Any employed member of a municipal law enforcement agency 
who possesses the statutory empowerment to detect, investigate, arrest, convict, detain, or 
rehabilitate people for violations of New Jersey criminal laws or who has successfully 
completed a Police Training Commission approved training course or an equivalent 
training course (N.J. Stat. Ann. 40A:14-118; 40A:14-146.9[h]; 40A:14-152; 40A:14-
152.1). 
Physical contact: Actions by police officers involving the bodily touching of a 
subject without force and which are routine or procedural in nature and necessary to 
effectively accomplish lawful objectives (e.g., handcuffing) (NJOAG, 2000).  
Physical force: Forceful actions by a police officer directed upon a subject which 
are not examples of mechanical force or deadly force (NJOAG, 2000). 
Public duties: Conduct required or authorized by law or court order (N.J. Stat. 
Ann. 2C:3-3 et seq.). 
Racially influenced policing (RIP): The use by police officers of a subject’s race 
or ethnicity as a factor in drawing inferences or conclusions about the subject’s 
involvement in criminal activity or as a factor in exercising discretion in stopping or 
otherwise treating a person (NJOAG, 2005a). 
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Racially influenced policing (RIP) directive: State policy prohibiting racially 
influenced policing (NJOAG, 2005a). 
Reasonable belief: An objective evaluation of “how a reasonable law enforcement 
officer with comparable training and experience would react to, or draw inferences from, 
the facts and circumstances confronting and known by the law enforcement officer at the 
scene” (NJOAG, 2000, p. 3). Reasonable belief “designates a belief the holding of which 
does not make the actor reckless or criminally negligent.” (N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:1-14[j]).  
Resistance: Passive, active, and violent actions and threats of such actions by 
subjects refusal to comply with the lawful demands of officers (N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:29-1 et 
seq.; 2C:29-2 et seq.; NJOAG, 2000). 
Serious bodily harm: Injury posing a “substantial risk of death or which causes 
serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any 
bodily member or organ” (N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:3-11[d]; 2C:11-1[b]). 
Suspect characteristics: Those features or qualities belonging exclusively to a 
subject, such as age, gender, race, and unusual conditions (Bolger, 2014; Klahm IV et al., 
2014). 
Unusual conditions: Mental state during which a subject suffers from impaired 
judgment, such as those resulting from intoxication or other cognitive impairments or 
psychological disorders.  
Assumptions 
I cannot demonstrate that certain aspects of this study were true, so several 
assumptions were necessary regarding police uses of force in the studied county. First, I 
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assumed that each agency promulgated their policies within the mandates of the NJOAG. 
Second, I assumed that the officers reported all uses of force and that the reports were 
truthfully completed. Third, various elements related to the circumstances regarding the 
use of force reporting form were assumed. All uses of force were assumed to be lawful, 
and unless otherwise indicated, all physical and mechanical force did not constitute 
deadly force. When unusual conditions were documented, I assumed that those 
conditions actually existed and were not merely present in the officer’s subjective 
perceptions. Finally, I assumed that each police agency retained every use of force 
reporting form submitted during the period being examined. These assumptions led to a 
complete picture of force use in the studied county and could not otherwise be created 
without access to records that are denied to the public by law. These are limitations 
covered in greater detail later in this chapter.  
Scope and Delimitations 
Defining the scope of this research requires a brief discussion on the nature of 
government and policing in New Jersey. The state is divided into 21 counties, each 
consisting of several municipalities (State of New Jersey, 2016). The state and county 
governments have one or more types of police agencies, each with a mission substantially 
different from municipal police agencies. Generally, state and county police agencies 
play a support role to municipalities, except that they may fulfill the municipal police role 
in municipalities that do not have their own police department. Where municipal police 
agencies exist, they maintain responsibility for routine police services within the entire 
political boundary of the municipality (N.J. Stat. Ann. 40A:14-118). All police agencies 
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are overseen by the NJOAG. The attorney general is the chief law enforcement officer for 
the state and may issue directives, guidelines, and policies to county prosecutors and all 
law enforcement agencies (N.J. Stat. Ann. 52:17B-97 et seq.). Each county prosecutor 
administers the rules promulgated by the attorney general but also maintains the authority 
to establish rules for the county and municipal police agencies within his or her 
jurisdiction (N.J. Stat. Ann. 52:17B-97 et seq.; County Prosecutor Study Commission, 
2011). 
In this study, I examined the municipal agencies in one New Jersey county, 
specifically, the influence of the RIP directive on municipal police officer uses of force in 
one New Jersey county between June 2000 and June 2010. Studying municipalities in one 
county ensured a degree of consistency among the police agency rules and practices, 
which may have affected force outcomes and might otherwise have been absent when 
examining municipal agencies from more than one county. Consistency in rules and 
practices was expected because all municipal agencies within the county were subject to 
the authority and oversight of their county prosecutor. Excluding county and state 
agencies was appropriate because their missions or operational limitations may be 
substantially different than municipal agencies. This exclusion was needed to maintain 
internal validity. 
While consistency was expected among these municipal agencies, each agency 
had the flexibility to make their rules more restrictive than those issued by the state and 
prosecutor. Also, agencies may seek accreditation through The Commission on 
Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies or the New Jersey State Association of 
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Chiefs of Police. Both accreditation agencies mandate stricter requirements for RIP and 
use of force than those of the state. Therefore, any agency with requirements more 
stringent than those of the state were excluded from analysis. This exclusion was needed 
to maintain internal validity. 
The decision to use one county was also a matter of practicality. I avoided 
extensive travel throughout the state. Moreover, I anticipated that all OPRA requests 
could be collected from the record custodians at each municipal agency within a 
reasonable time period. The timeframe was focused on the 5 years before and after the 
promulgation of the RIP directive in 2005. Prior to that, in 2000, the use of force policy 
was revised and has remained unchanged to the present. In 2010, the state authorized the 
use of electronic control devices (i.e., Tasers) as a force option. This authorization did not 
alter the use of force policy, but it did represent a change in how officers could deliver 
force. Therefore, studying the 5 years before and after the RIP provided a degree of 
consistency to the force options available during the timeframe.  
Caution should be used when generalizing these findings to the larger New Jersey 
municipal police use of force population. Data for this study was collected from 
municipal police agencies in only one county. The sample used for this analysis was 
small and did not include data from the larger range of socioeconomic environments and 
urban-rural classifications found in the state. Additionally, the collected data only 
permitted a small number of variables to be analyzed. Still, the sample used here was a 
subset of the New Jersey population, and the use of force reports used in the analysis 
were chosen at random.  
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The target population was all documented municipal police officer uses of force 
between June 2000 and June 2010 in one New Jersey county. The population excluded 
force used by police, sheriff’s officers, and corrections officers employed by county, 
state, and federal agencies that conduct law enforcement activities within the county. All 
reports indicating the use of force by municipal police officers were eligible for inclusion 
into this study except those deemed unlawful or otherwise in violation of policy by an 
agency or a court. These exclusions were necessary to ensure internal validity. 
I considered using but excluded rational choice theory to frame the research 
because certain assumptions were inappropriate. Rational choice assumes that actors 
understand their preferences and make deliberate choices based on available information 
and limitations to achieve the best outcomes given their aims (Wittek, Snijders, & Nee, 
2013). This reasoning might help explain why officers take certain forceful actions with 
only limited information, but it does not help explain officer preferences. Rational choice 
theory must assume that officers want to use and escalate force, and desire the 
administrative and judicial reviews that may result in punishment. No scholarly evidence 
supports those assumptions. Force incidents are rare, and research has shown that officers 
tend to use lesser force than necessary to accomplish their objectives (International 
Association of Chiefs of Police [IACP], 2012; Terrill, 2001, 2005). Given the findings of 
prior research, rational choice theory was excluded. 
I also considered racial threat theory to frame this study but found its use limited. 
Racial threat theory proposes that Whites use their power to implement state control over 
minority populations (Blalock, 1967). However, given that New Jersey has never had a 
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minority governor and the legislature historically has been predominantly White, the 
theory cannot explain the existence of the RIP directive or other laws intended to prohibit 
repressive state control of minority populations. This is not to suggest that the theory is 
inappropriate in similar studies, as it has been used with mixed results to explain 
disparities in police expenditures, arrests, sentencing, and capital punishment (Dollar, 
2014). Still, the actions of officers that are inconsistent with the rules do not, by 
themselves, suggest an outcome intended by the state. 
Limitations 
Several important limitations influenced the outcomes and treatment of the data.  
The first limitation was that the New Jersey use of force reporting form was not intended 
for this study but rather was intended to memorialize police uses of force. As a result, 
many forms omitted variable responses and impacted the number of variables that could 
be studied. 
The second limitation was the version of the use of force form submitted by 
officers. During this period, an older version of the report that remained in circulation did 
not provide for reporting officer race and gender. Also, some agency leaders created their 
own versions of this form that omitted officer variables. These forms were present in a 
large portion of the sample and resulted in the exclusion of the officer race and officer 
gender variables. 
The third limitation involved reporting of force. The New Jersey use of force 
policy requires that the reporting form be completed after each use of force (NJOAG, 
2000). There is no reliable method by which to know if officers in the county were 
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meticulous in their adherence to the rule. Therefore, I assumed that officers submitted all 
necessary reports to their agencies. 
The fourth limitation concerned the veracity of the information supplied on the 
reporting form. This report is one method by which officers justify their actions. The 
information contained on the report cannot be considered strictly objective (Atherley & 
Hickman, 2014). However, officers would have been well served by providing honest 
answers given that providing false information could have subjected the officer to 
prosecution for false swearing or perjury (N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:28-1; 2C:28-2). In the 
absence of a method to ensure truthfulness, I assumed that all information provided by 
the officers was completely truthful.  
The fifth limitation involved how officers indicate the presence of unusual 
conditions. Items in this category include intoxication and other conditions not defined. 
Intoxication has a precise legal definition, but other conditions identified by the officers 
do not have concrete or legal definitions. Officers provided information denoting mental 
illness, emotional disturbances, and medical emergencies. They answered this category 
based on the information gathered on the scene or through the lens of their training and 
experience, frequently without the benefit of confirmation by forensic toxicology or 
professional expert opinions. It is unknown if intoxication or other unusual circumstances 
actually existed or their cause, so when indicated, I assumed that an unusual condition 
existed.   
The sixth limitation concerned my ability to elevate force use into the deadly 
force category. As explained in the discussion of variables in Chapter 3, some instances 
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of physical and mechanical force might actually be deadly force because they posed a 
substantial risk of causing serious bodily injury or death. No reports provided evidence of 
this enhanced danger. Therefore, absent such indication, I assumed that the reported level 
of force was a proper representation of the force used. 
The eighth limitation of this study was that the data did not indicate if the force 
used was unlawful. Unlawful uses of force are not considered force per the policy; they 
are considered crimes punishable under the criminal code. Because no reports were 
marked as unlawful, I was unable to know if a report should be excluded from 
examination. Therefore, all force reporting forms were considered documentation of 
lawful uses of force. 
The final limitation was that other significant variables were omitted. Important 
items such as other agency policies influencing police officer actions and local crime 
rates are not reflected on the collection instrument. Another important omitted variable 
was inframarginality, or differential offending rates among races, which may have 
affected the outcomes of this research, making it difficult to quantify racial bias (Ayers, 
2002; Horn, McCluskey, & Mittelhammer, 2013; Simoiu, Corbett-Davies, & Goel, 
2016). These problems are present in most force studies. These limitations must simply 
be accepted as they cannot be changed until more advanced statistical methods have been 
deemed reliable. 
Undisclosed conflicts of interest may affect the independence, integrity, and 
reporting of research findings. Therefore, I must disclose parts of my background that 
may have influenced this study. I have been employed by municipal and county New 
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Jersey police agencies. I retired as a police lieutenant, a position wherein I supervised and 
managed officers in the patrol division, a group responsible for providing the uniformed 
police services commonly associated with police work. At the end of my career, I was the 
officer in charge of my department’s Internal Affairs and Professional Standards Unit, 
which investigated allegations of officer misconduct. I have family members who were 
police officers and some who remain police officers in New Jersey and other states. 
Finally, I established a business entity in New Jersey that offers consulting services for 
police misconduct litigation, agency development, and oversight. I endeavored to prevent 
my own conflicts and biases from influencing this research by not collecting data from 
my employing agencies and through proper design, analysis, and reporting. 
Significance of the Study 
This research contributed to knowledge within the discipline and advancing 
practice and policy and promoting positive social change. Previous studies of force 
within the criminal justice and policy disciplines were marred by difficulties in 
conceptualization and operationalization of variables. The design of this research may aid 
future force studies by providing conceptualizations and operationalizations of force 
variables in a manner reflective of the policy paradigm. Because of these findings, 
researchers may better assist practitioners and policymakers, and civilians and policy 
makers can better communicate. This study demonstrated how civilians can monitor the 
forceful actions of their police through the use of public records when data is not 
regularly published in public forums. Also, the results of this study added a new 
dimension to what is known about the effects of administrative rules to constrain police 
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discretion. Scholarly research had not addressed the influence of administrative rules 
prohibiting RIP where implicit biases may be unrecognized by officers and their 
supervisors, and where these implicit biases affect official actions. This quantitative study 
examined that scholarly gap. 
Government officials, police practitioners, and civilians may find value in the 
conceptualizations, methods, and results of this study. The findings can help frame the 
policy paradigm encompassing the problem and reveal the effectiveness of the RIP 
directive as a tool for police administrators to uphold the social contract and guarantee 
the equal protection of all civilians during forceful encounters. Framing the problem 
within the context of policy not only leads to a discovery of policy efficacy but also 
provides civilians with insight into the details of how government structures and delimits 
their lives and opportunities. This information can be harnessed for use in political 
discourse to promote equal protection for all, restore trust, and advance public policy 
choices reflective of community values. 
Government officials, police practitioners, and civilians will benefit from this 
study, as it demonstrates and corrects for an immanent confusion in policy terminology. 
The use of force policies and force continuums confuse the differences between coercion 
and force, preventing government officials and police practitioners from communicating 
with the public without ambiguous jargon. While this issue is present in scholarly 
literature and should be addressed in that realm, its presence in public policy serves to 
disrupt honest evaluations of the RIP and force phenomena during policy debates and 
public discourse and complicates civilian attempts to monitor police actions. This study 
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offers a solution to align policy with common definitions of coercion and force to so that 
all can communicate with a shared language while seeking to restore trust between the 
police and civilians.  
 Police practitioners might be aided by the analytical methods used in this study. 
The current findings serve as an example of the value of these methods in monitoring 
officers for explicit and implicit racism as a part of an agency’s early intervention system. 
These methods are not inaccessible to police administrators, and, if desired, can be 
readily replicated in common spreadsheet programs without the need for expensive 
proprietary software.   
The implications for positive social change include the empowerment of the 
public with the skills needed to monitor police uses of force through the use of publicly 
available information. Moreover, citizens can better understand the nuances of the force 
phenomenon that are contributing to the problem of trust between a large segment of 
society and the police, and the public policy context in which that problem exists. The 
dissertation and its findings provide granular detail of actual force incidents to facilitate 
political discourse and promote evidence-based policy decisions intended to strengthen 
trust between police and civilians. 
Summary 
The government and the people have a social contract requiring the government’s 
equal treatment of its citizens. Recent events have called into question the government’s 
ability to fulfill that obligation. Several highly publicized incidents involving police uses 
of force on members of minority populations have coincided with a historic reduction in 
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the public’s trust and confidence in the police to treat everyone equally (Jones, 2015; Pew 
Research Center, 2014). The lack of trust in police damages the legitimacy and authority 
of the police and government, and threatens the quality of life of all citizens, particularly 
communities comprised of racial minority populations (Keita, 2014; Meares, Tyler, & 
Gardener, 2014; Nix, Wolfe, Rojek, & Kaminski, 2014; Rahr & Rice, 2014; Richardson, 
2015; White House, 2014). Still, the perceptions of widespread police abuse of racial 
minorities is supported only with anecdotal but not empirical analysis (House Judiciary 
Committee, 2016). Government officials and police practitioners must address the trust 
problem using evidence-based steps supported by the best available research (Pew 
Charitable Trusts, 2014). The use of rules to prevent RIP offers one potential solution. 
The extant literature has shown that administrative rules are effective at constraining 
officer actions during critical incidents involving force (Anderson et al., 2002; Fyfe, 
1978, 1979; Terrill & Paoline III, 2016). If rulemaking is effective at preventing RIP, 
then the application of force should not disproportionately impact any racial category. 
This study provided an evaluation of the ability of an administrative rule to prevent RIP 
during officer uses of force. 
Chapter 1 furnished a synopsis of this quantitative research. In answering the 
research question regarding the influence of the RIP directive on officer uses of force, I 
determined the nature and scope of police uses of force during a 10-year period in New 
Jersey, the degree to which officers impartially dispense force, and the effectiveness of 
the RIP directive as a tool to ensure equal protection of all civilians during incidents 
involving force. Terms used in this study were made explicit, along with assumptions, 
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limitations, and delimitations. The chapter further indicated the implications of the 
findings to contribute to knowledge within the public policy and administration 
discipline, advance evidence-based policing and policy practices, and promote positive 
social change.  
In Chapter 2, I will provide an in-depth literature review relating to the theoretical 
foundation of this study, the extent of the force phenomenon, and the extant research on 
the use of rules to constrain police discretion and use of force. I will identify those 
entities capable of promulgating rules to New Jersey police agencies. I will also describe 
the state of public policy regarding RIP and force in New Jersey.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
Public confidence in the police continues to decline. Intense media coverage of 
several extrajudicial killings of racial minority members and the protests that followed 
have led to wide-ranging allegations about the police and intense public debate regarding 
police reforms (Weitzer, 2015). These incidents correspond with public opinion polls 
showing confidence in police at a historic low (Jones, 2015). Many people do not believe 
police treat minority populations fairly (Pew Research Center, 2014). This problem 
affects both the police and citizens as it undermines the legitimacy and authority of the 
police (Meares et al., 2014; Nix et al., 2014; Rahr & Rice, 2014; Richardson, 2015), and 
threatens the quality of life of all citizens, particularly communities comprised of racial 
minority populations (Richardson, 2015; White House, 2014). Administrative rules offer 
the ability for police agencies to structure and confine the behaviors of their officers in 
ways that might restore the public trust (Davis, 1969, 1975; Walker & Archbold, 2014). 
This study was designed to examine the influence of the New Jersey RIP directive on 
police uses of force to determine if it prevents officers from using race as a factor in their 
decisions and if RIP is an effective tool for public administrators.  
The opinion that police unfairly treat minorities contrasts with established public 
policies in many states outlawing racial profiling. According to the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP, 2014), 30 states have laws prohibiting 
racial profiling. Many of the states that have seen high-profile incidents of police 
violence against racial minorities, such as California, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, 
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and Missouri, have such laws. SLBT helps explain when officers engage in RIP despite 
existing rules. According to the theory, the SLB is someone often faced with the task of 
fulfilling ambiguous policies within a rule-laden environment and treating all citizens 
equally; at the same time, he or she must deliver government benefits and sanctions but 
be responsive to the unique individual circumstances posed by those with whom the 
bureaucrat must interact (Lipsky, 2010). Since it is impossible to treat everyone the same 
while attending to special circumstances, these workers use the discretion afforded to 
their positions to manage their environment by developing unsanctioned coping 
mechanisms, sometimes in conflict with existing rules (Lipsky, 2010). These mechanisms 
typically involve the differentiation of clients, and without sufficient supervision, become 
de facto public policy (Davis, 1969, 1975; Lipsky, 2010).  
Lipsky (2010) has demonstrated that police officers are such street-level 
bureaucrats who enjoy a wide degree of discretion in their duties, but their performance is 
governed by rules (Davis, 1969, 1975; White, 2001). The use of rules to constrain police 
behavior has been found effective in reducing incidents of deadly force, non-deadly 
force, and vehicle pursuits (Becknell, Larry Mays, & Giever, 1999; Crew, Kessler, & 
Fridell, 1995; Fyfe, 1978, 1979; Terrill & Paoline; 2016; Walker, 1993; White, 2000, 
2001, 2003). Officers who do not follow the rules engage in misconduct. The extent to 
which such misconduct occurs is unknown, but studies have shown that most officers 
follow the rules (Harris, 2011; McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; Walker, 2001b). Those 
officers who defy rules and established public policy regarding RIP influence the public’s 
negative opinion that police officers unfairly treat minority populations. 
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As a matter of public policy, New Jersey, the first state in the nation to create a 
policy outlawing RIP, rejects racial discrimination (NJOAG, 2005b). It also one of the 
few states that treat RIP as a crime punishable by a mandatory prison sentence of no less 
than 5 years (see NAACP, 2014). The policy is clear and only one among many created 
by several layers of government designed to influence policing in the state. Still, the 
extant literature provides no indication that a rule prohibiting RIP influences police 
behavior, the gap addressed in this study. 
New Jersey does not suffer from the same data collection, conceptualization, or 
operationalization difficulties present in the media, the federal government, and scholarly 
analyses of police force usage. Researchers have had problems gathering data and faced 
inconsistent definitions and measurements (see Comey, 2015; Fryer, 2016; Klahm IV & 
Tillyer, 2010; Terrill & Paoline III, 2012; Walker, 2003; Withrow & Williams, 2015). 
Researchers have also used benchmarks fraught with limitations (see Walker, 2003; 
Withrow & Williams, 2015).  Although New Jersey has a statewide policy overcoming 
most of these difficulties, the state has not overcome the benchmark obstacle. Like other 
assessments, external benchmarks leave room for error, such as those created by failures 
to accurately capture local demographics and populations, rates of police exposure, and 
differential offending rates (Ayers, 2002; Horn et al., 2013; Simoiu et al., 2016; Withrow 
& Williams, 2015). Internal benchmarking overcomes the disadvantages of external 
benchmarking because it is an outcomes-based assessment that compares data, such as 
arrests and summonses, from similarly situated units exposed to the similar contextual 
environments operating under similar rules. The data contained in use of force reports 
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allows for internal benchmark comparisons, but there is no instruction or mechanism 
requiring this type of analysis. 
Unlike a simple count of force use frequency, New Jersey requires data collection 
on force usage that includes the presence of several variables present in the extant 
research. Over the past several decades, scholars have discovered that many variables 
may influence police uses of force. This literature review will explore the findings of 
many of these studies and demonstrate their connection to my research. Still, these 
studies have suffered from problems associated with conceptualization and 
operationalization, making it difficult to compare the findings across the various research 
(Bolger, 2014; Klahm IV & Tillyer, 2010). The variables found to influence officer 
behavior can be categorized into suspect, encounter, officer, neighborhood, and 
organizational characteristics. Bolger (2014) suggested certain suspect and encounter 
characteristics significantly influence force use, such as the seriousness of the offense and 
resistance. The reporting mechanism used in New Jersey collects many of the studied 
variables and some of those found to be most influential in the use of force. To the extent 
possible, this study controlled for these variables to determine the influence of the RIP 
directive on officer uses of force. 
In this chapter, I will review information significant as a background for this 
study. I begin by explaining my literature collection strategy followed by a description of 
the theoretical framework. Finally, I provide a literature review of concepts involved in 
administrative rules, a description of the police non- and deadly force phenomenon, the 
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structure of administrative control in the New Jersey policing enterprise, rules affecting 
police operations, and numerous officer use-of-force decision-making variables. 
Literature Search Strategy 
To find literature related to this study, multiple Boolean search terms were created 
from a combination of words and phrases, including accountability, decision making, 
discretion, force, forceful encounters, police, police-citizen encounters, street-level 
bureaucrat, use of force, use of violence, and working rules. These terms were then used 
to gather peer-reviewed literature from the ProQuest Criminal Justice Periodicals Index, 
Political Science Complete, Business Source Complete, and SAGE Premier for the period 
between January 1, 1996, to April 31, 2017. I added literature that was known to be 
related to the study but gathered during my career in policing. This effort created a 
starting set of literature upon which a snowball method, guided by Wohlin (2014), was 
used to find additional literature. A subsequent Google Scholar search was conducted 
using the same parameters in search of literature that may not have been located followed 
by another snowball iteration. I gave greater attention to peer-reviewed articles and other 
scholarly sources within the last 10 years, particularly those within 5 years, involving 
studies of U.S. police officers. The scope of the literature spanned peer-reviewed articles, 
dissertations and theses, books, reports of professional organizations, government-
published documents, and seminal literature related to the topics. 
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Theoretical Foundation 
The Street-Level Bureaucrat 
Lower-level government employees are instruments of public policy affecting the 
lives of those served. Lipsky (2010) named those employees street-level bureaucrats 
(SLBs). They work in a realm distinguished by a high degree of uncertainty caused by 
societal difficulties and the need to make frequent or rapid decisions (Lipsky, 2010). 
SLBs, playing an important role in society through their direct contact with citizens, 
deliver government benefits and sanctions that structure and delimit the lives and 
opportunities of those citizens (Lipsky, 2010). SLBs wield considerable discretion in the 
day-to-day execution of public programs, meaning that they choose from among various 
courses of action based on their judgment (Worden, Harris, & McClean, 2014). Their 
individual actions are the extension of the state’s influence and control over its citizens 
and in aggregate embody public policy (Lipsky, 2010).  
Street-level bureaucrats use discretion to overcome the combination of agency 
rules, unclear policies, insufficient resources, and the flood of public demands that 
complicate policy implementation. Facing the contradiction of following programmatic 
agency routines and rules designed to provide equal treatment for all clients, SLBs must 
respond to unique and individual circumstances (Lipsky, 2010). Their work of fulfilling 
an unlimited public demand is made more difficult by limited resources and equivocal 
objectives (Lipsky, 2010; Matland, 1995). SLBs use discretion to develop coping 
mechanisms filling the gap between utopian performance and reality (Lipsky, 2010; 
Matland, 1995). The result is that SLBs do for some what they cannot do for everyone by 
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rationing and restricting services through the differentiation of clients (Lipsky, 2010). 
Those deemed deserving are given added attention while the undeserving receive 
imposing degrees of burden associated with their receipt of rights and benefits (Lipsky, 
2010). These mechanisms are rarely approved by their agencies but are often necessary to 
achieve some degree of agency success.  
The cumulative effect of street-level decisions made on the basis of coping 
mechanisms can alter the intended policy direction and could become destructive. 
Dunsire (1990) called this changed direction the implementation gap, which differentiates 
intended policy outcomes from the actual positive and negative effects caused by civil 
servant behaviors. This gap has also been referred to it as an implementation deficit and 
incongruent implementation (Hupe, Hill, & Namgia, 2014). Lipsky (2010) focused most 
on the negative outcomes caused by coping mechanisms finding that they might 
undermine citizens’ expectations of equal treatment. Unsanctioned mechanisms might be 
constructed with elements of stereotypes, prejudice, and racism normally present within 
the broader context of society capable of causing harm to many people. These coping 
mechanisms can lead to claims of reduced care and favoritism (Lipsky, 2010). The use of 
unsanctioned coping mechanisms provides an explanation for instances of 
institutionalized prejudice contradicting published policy, such as in instances where 
police officers have used race as a factor in drawing inferences or conclusions about a 
person’s involvement in criminal activity. 
The potential pitfalls of coping mechanisms lead to arguments to cease all SLB 
discretion, but such arguments fail to account for public desires (Lipsky, 2010). Public 
32 
 
policy cannot create algorithms for programmed decisions that provide both impartiality 
and flexibility (Lipsky, 2010). SLBs are afforded discretion in part because society does 
not want the inflexible application of standards without an ability to show compassion 
and pliability in unique situations (Lipsky, 2010). The result is that SLBs are expected to 
professionally exercise discretion within their fields. 
Lipsky (2010) explained that the ability of SLBs to exercise discretion is not 
unrestrained by rules or directives, but such efforts achieve limited success. This was a 
weakness in his study, as Lipsky offered only the typical suggestions to control 
discretion, such as holding SLBs accountable for agency objectives, reducing discretion, 
and constraining alternatives through rules, audits, and sanctions. The intended effect of 
these measures is to standardize behavior, generate employee awareness of management 
oversight, and direct workers’ efforts (Lipsky, 2010). Agency policies supported by 
significant sanctions help achieve desired behaviors. However, Lipsky acknowledged that 
rules may impede supervision. If rules become too voluminous or contradictory, 
management will be compelled to engage in selective enforcement. 
Street-level bureaucrats may resist controls over their discretion because their 
priorities differ from their managers. Specifically, SLBs are interested in processing their 
work in a manner consistent with their preferences, minimizing real dangers and 
discomforts, and maximizing income and personal gratification (Lipsky, 2010). 
Managers, on the other hand, are interested in achieving agency goals and objectives. 
When supervision is minimal, evaluation of SLBs becomes difficult as supervisors are 
unable to directly observe the intangible factors leading to SLB decisions (Lipsky, 2010). 
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Additionally, auditing is complicated when SLBs complete paperwork in a way that 
guards against later adverse inspection (Lipsky, 2010). SLBs can capitalize on 
weaknesses inherent with insufficient supervision to maintain control of their work 
despite the controls applied by management. 
Previous Applications of SLBT 
SLBT has been successfully applied across multiple dimensions of the social 
sciences, but the area most similar to this study are those examining policy 
implementation and the degree to which outcomes are based on race (Keiser, 2010; 
Marschall, Rigby, & Jenkins, 2011; Morrell & Currie, 2015; Tummers & Rocco, 2015). 
Three recent studies in the areas of welfare, election administration, and housing involved 
policy implementation where outcomes are assessed based on the race of the recipient. 
Ernst, Nguyen, and Taylor (2013) used SLBT to frame their qualitative 
examination of the quality of service of all Community Services Offices in Washington 
state to determine if service differed based on race. Citizens claim their social rights 
through these offices (Hasenfeld, Rafferty, & Zald, 1987). Ernst et al. found that White 
men had the most positive interactions with staff in these offices while Black women had 
the worst. In the face-to-face interactions, the White investigator consistently had more 
positive interactions and received more information than the other investigators, 
particularly more than the Black investigator. The results indicate a degree of 
institutionalized racism at the hands of SLBs, contrary to stated policy. 
White, Nathan, and Faller (2015) used SLBT for their quantitative experiment 
intended to measure U.S. local election administrators’ email responses to constituents of 
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different ethnicities. The study involved two emails from putative White and Hispanic 
sounding names. The email from the White name asked a less politicized question, while 
the email from the Hispanic name asked for information about voter ID laws. The authors 
discovered that Hispanics were less likely to receive accurate responses and less likely to 
receive informative responses than non-Latino emailers. While these election officials are 
responsible for providing a fair and voter-friendly atmosphere, the authors found that the 
election officials showed bias against Hispanics. 
Einstein and Glick (2016) used SLBT in their quantitative experiment to gauge 
racial bias in affordable housing programs in large metropolitan and micropolitan areas. 
Similar to White et al. (2015), the authors sent emails asking how to apply for public 
housing. They found that response rates for Hispanics were significantly lower than those 
of White and Blacks. They also discovered that Hispanics also received less friendly 
replies. The results of this study indicate that SLBs from this sample population do 
engage in behavior conflicting with anti-discrimination  
The previous research has found that public officials sometimes do engage in 
racially motivated behaviors that create a de facto policy in conflict with established 
public policy. The actions of the studied officials would have significantly structured and 
delimited the lives and opportunities of those they served. These studies serve as 
examples of the validity for the use of SLBT in research examining racial disparities that 
may occur during policy implementation 
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Rationale for Use of Street-Level Bureaucrats Theory 
I examined the effect of the New Jersey RIP directive on officer decisions to use 
force across one county. The use of SLBT is appropriate as Lipsky (2010) wrote, police 
officers are SLBs. They operate in an uncertain environment, regularly without the 
benefit of complete information upon which to make decisions, generally with copious 
rules but without direct supervision, sometimes acting in opposition to those rules while 
trying to serve ambiguous objectives. Officers frequently interact with citizens and use 
discretion to deliver government benefits and sanctions that may have far-reaching 
effects on the lives of the citizens, their families, and the community (Brooks, 2015; 
Sekhon, 2011; Walker & Archbold, 2014). Among their discretionary tools is the 
absolute authority and responsibility to use of both non- and deadly force (Brooks, 2015; 
Sekhon, 2011; Walker & Archbold, 2014). Their use of deadly force is the ultimate 
extension of the state’s influence and control over its citizens. There is long history in the 
United States of government sanctioned racial disparities involving a wide array of 
government benefits and sanctions, especially those offered by police (Cooper, 2015; 
IACP, 2016; Uchida, 2015). Recent highly publicized deaths of Black men at the hand of 
police have been held as evidence that police use more force, especially deadly force, on 
minorities (Chaney & Robertson, 2015). Where officer uses of force show racially 
disparate impact on citizens, SLBT would help explain that policy implementation gap. 
Support for the use of SLBT in the current research can be drawn from Davis 
(1969, 1975). In his study of discretion in the criminal justice system, Davis (1969) found 
that the realm of statutes and judge-made law were overdeveloped, while those with the 
36 
 
greatest exercises of discretion were underdeveloped, such as administrative, police, and 
prosecutorial justice. Davis’s (1975) qualitative study of the administrative processes of 
the Chicago Police Department found that local police operations were guided by the 
false pretense that all laws are enforced by officers while the reality demonstrated that 
there were insufficient resources to achieve that goal. Instead, officers regularly enforced 
some laws, almost never enforced others, and still other laws were enforced based on the 
attitudes of the officer, with those decisions sometimes based on the offending person or 
occasion. Davis (1975) concluded that much of the police department’s enforcement 
policy is determined by the low-level officers, who did so without the benefit of legal 
advisers, and whose personal enforcement policies usually differed from department 
policies and that of other officers. Davis (1975) asserted that the discretionary actions of 
officers led to the majority of claims involving injustice. 
Davis (1975) and Lipsky (2010) were similar in their belief that discretion is 
necessary for the work of SLBs, but the authors differed in their beliefs regarding its 
control. Unlike Lipsky, Davis proffered the elimination of unnecessary discretion while 
controlling necessary discretion. Unfortunately, Davis did not expand on what could be 
considered necessary discretion, perhaps a deliberate choice. He proposed a revolutionary 
method to determine local policing priorities that would supply greater opportunity for 
equal protection under the law while leaving available the individualized application of 
law in unique circumstances. Davis’s administrative rulemaking proposal made his study 
a key work of scholarship in what is now known as democratic policing (Friedman & 
Ponomarenko, 2015). Still, Davis’s idea of communities and police administrators 
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collaborating to establish police priorities has not been widely accepted, but his 
recommendations for the construction of administrative rules is widely used. 
The substance of a rule was a matter a special attention as it would be the tool to 
control officer behavior. Officer behavior was to be confined through the use of a written 
policy detailing what can and cannot be done, structured by specifying factors the officer 
should consider when making a decision, and checked through the review of incident 
reports (Davis, 1975; Walker & Archbold, 2014). Later research would show that officers 
ranking higher than the immediate supervisor should review these reports because the 
immediate supervisor was frequently fulfilling a supportive role in protecting subordinate 
officers from unfair discipline (U.S. DOJ, 2003). The information contained within the 
rule itself was the vehicle by which the policy would be implemented.  
New Jersey police officers have the authority and responsibility to use non- and 
deadly force when administering public policy. The RIP and use of force directives 
follow the Davis (1969, 1975) rule model by confining, structuring, and checking officer 
behavior to prevent unlawful uses of force. If racial disparities are found in police uses of 
force, SLBT serves as a framework to understand how they might have occurred. 
Extent of the Force Phenomenon 
The extent to which police officers use force is not known. According to Walker 
and Archbold (2014), only 1–2% of citizen-police encounters result in the use of force. 
Hickman, Piquero, and Garner (2008) concluded that, nationally, only 1.7% of all police 
contacts result in some kind of force. Others have described police uses of force as a 
small percentage of police-citizen encounters or simply rare (Alpert & Dunham, 2004; 
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IACP, 2012; Pollock & Reynolds, 2015; Terrill, 2001, 2003, 2005). Force is used in 15–
20% of arrests (Smith et al., 2010). Still, when force is used, lower levels of force are 
more commonly applied (Garner, Maxwell, & Heraux, 2002; Lawton, 2007; Terrill & 
Mastrofski, 2002). Despite these assurances, data collection in this arena has remained a 
challenge. 
Problems With Data Collection 
The limitations for collecting data to analyze the extent of police uses of force 
against citizens on a national scale include (a) a lack of a common definition of force; (b) 
widely varying perspectives and perceptions of force within and among the police and 
civilian communities; (c) the absence of mandatory reporting mechanisms to collect such 
data; and (d) greater attention by scholars and the media on deadly force over non-deadly 
force, with few studies examining both. 
The lack of a commonly accepted definition of police use of force makes an 
assessment of the phenomenon difficult. Scholars identified this dilemma for the 
purposes of research (Adams, 1995, 2015; Bittner, 1970; Klahm IV & Tillyer, 2010). 
Garner, Schade, Hepburn, and Buchanan (1995) helped researchers achieve a common 
scholarly definition when they applied the National Academy of Sciences definition of 
violence to their research. In their study, force was described as “behaviors by individuals 
that intentionally threaten, attempt, or inflict physical harm on others” (p. 152). Still, 
subsequent research has suffered from a disjuncture between conceptualizations of force 
and operationalization of the construct leaving the definition among most studies ill-
defined and operationalization inconsistent across studies (Klahm IV, Frank, & 
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Liederbach, 2014). On a national scale, the criminal justice system has not had a similar 
level of agreement as police agencies have no commonly accepted definition of force 
(Walker & Archbold, 2014, p. 79), except perhaps that of deadly force (Adams, 2015).  
An important limitation to understanding the extent of the force phenomenon is 
the lack of an effective mechanism to collect data. In the months that followed several 
publicized incidents, James Comey (2015), director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, acknowledged that even he had difficulty measuring the frequency of 
deadly force using the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) because reporting by police 
agencies is voluntary, and few agencies submit data. Comey admitted that the data that 
have been collected by the FBI is incomplete and unreliable. Additionally, the UCR is of 
no value in measuring non-deadly force incidents because such reporting is not collected 
even on a voluntary basis. The newer National Incident-Based Reporting System is also a 
flawed measure in that regard. The Bureau of Justice Statistics data from the Arrest-
Related Death component of the Death in Custody Reporting Program is flawed because 
the methodology has been demonstrated to capture only 72% of the estimated reportable 
deaths (Banks & Planty, 2015). Included among reportable deaths are those where 
someone died in the presence of a police officer but not in the officer’s custody, and 
those not directly related to police action or negligence, such as deaths caused by 
intoxication, suicide, and natural causes (U.S. DOJ, 2012). 
Despite the criminal justice measurement failures presented above, official 
government records may still provide insight into the phenomenon. Public health records 
have been used to measure the deadly force phenomenon. Krieger, Kiang, Chen, and 
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Waterman (2015) used public health records to calculate deaths caused by legal 
intervention. The term legal intervention was simply defined as “deaths due to law 
enforcement actions” without any further clarification, so it is unclear what categories of 
people are included in law enforcement or what actions constitute legal intervention (p. 
1). Analyzing national mortality data from 1960-2010, Krieger et al. found 15,699 
incidents of death attributed to legal intervention, excluding lawful executions. Of those, 
63.3% involved men between the ages of 15–34, where Whites accounted for 55.3% and 
Blacks for 42.3%. The authors note limitations to publicly available national mortality 
data, specifically the likely underreporting of police killings, a lack of real-time data 
reporting, and the aggregation of data to the county level. These gaps cannot be filled by 
the National Violent Death Reporting System because that system only receives data 
from 32 states (Barber et al., 2016; Krieger et al., 2015). Krieger et al. recommended 
making all law-enforcement-related deaths a reportable health condition to improve 
future knowledge and accountability of the phenomenon. Doing so would require an 
administrative rule by public health agencies and would serve as an independent method 
of accountability as it would exist outside law enforcement enterprises. 
While the government has yet to develop a system to accurately collect data on 
police deadly force incidents, other organizations of varying degrees of reliability have 
started to fill the data void. Operation Ghetto Storm (OGS) has not put forth a new 
analysis of extrajudicial killings by police since 2014, but it is still active in providing 
social commentary. In 2012, OGS published a report claiming that a Black person is 
killed by police every 28 hours but might be closer to every 24 hours (Eisen, 2014). This 
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analysis showed a “War against Black people” evidenced by the “[government’s] practice 
of executing Black people without pretense of a trial, jury, or judge [and which] is an 
integral part of the government’s current overall strategy of containing the Black 
community in a state of perpetual colonial subjugation and exploitation” (Eisen, 2014, p. 
1, 4). This figure was used by individuals with scholarly backgrounds in the mainstream 
and peripheral media sources and by protest groups calling for greater police 
accountability to indicate the frequency with which police kill Black people (Carruthers, 
2014; Hamm, 2016; Hill, 2014; A. Hudson, 2013).  
Although the OGS figure has been used in the media to indicate the extent of 
police killings, Eisen (2014) intended the report to be an examination of extrajudicial 
killings believed to be attributed to a racist government and its policies through state-
sanctioned actors. These actors include police officers, private security guards, and 
vigilantes. The author’s conceptualization of extrajudicial killing by police is any death 
coinciding with contact by someone or something subjectively perceived to be related to 
the police. Extrajudicial killing by police is operationalized by measuring intentional and 
unintentional death at the hands of state-sanctioned actors, including those deaths caused 
by traffic accidents, accidental firearm discharges, and unsecured weapons used by 
children. The analysis provided by the author was meant neither to serve as an evaluation 
of only sworn police officers employed by police agencies nor an indication of the 
frequency with which they use deadly force during their official duties. Nonetheless, 
without reliable data from the government, sources such as this have been held by many 
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as a national estimate of extrajudicial killings by sworn police officers (Carruthers, 2014; 
Hamm, 2016; Hill, 2014; A. Hudson, 2013). 
Other sources have emerged to fill the gap in government data claiming to count 
police killings. The sources have used data obtained through researchers, public records, 
and crowd-sourcing. For 2016, among the numerous organizations claiming to count 
deaths attributed to police, the following organizations reported the following deaths, 
Copcrisis.com–1,152; Fatalencounters.org–1,568; and Killedbypolice.net–1,162. These 
websites share data and include deaths through unintentional and negligent means (e.g., 
traffic accidents) and deaths in custodial detention (e.g., jails and prisons). None of the 
websites claim to measure police use of deadly force, but like the OGS report, there is a 
broad conceptualization and operationalization of killing by police which is quite 
different from deaths attributed to the intentional use of deadly force by a sworn police 
acting under the color of law. While the information provided by these websites is 
important and may have a significant public policy and risk management applications, the 
validity of any claim to measure uses of deadly force by police officers during their 
official duties is tenuous without disaggregating the data. Use of these numbers with the 
purpose to represent the frequency of duty-related deadly force used by police is 
inaccurate.  
Larger mainstream media organizations have also created databases and provided 
analysis on police uses of deadly force. The Guardian’s “The Counted” series tracks the 
number of people killed by police, including negligent deaths, while The Washington 
Post counts police fatal shootings. These sites collect their data using resources similar to 
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those previously mentioned including crowd-sourcing, but The Guardian suffers from the 
conceptualization and operationalization flaws found on those websites, and the 
journalists make no attempt to connect the incident to official duties. In contrast, The 
Washington Post calculates all police shootings including those resulting from accidental 
discharges but not those believed to be murder by off-duty officers. It does not capture 
deaths attributed to force actions not related to firearms. It is unclear if the data contain 
instances where a police officer’s firearm was used by another person. For 2016, The 
Guardian reported 1,093 (53% White, 24% Black, 17% Hispanic, 2% Asian/Pacific 
Islander, 2% Native American, and 2% unknown) police-related deaths and The 
Washington Post reported 963 (48% White, 24% Black, 17% Hispanic, 4% other, and 7% 
unknown) police shooting fatalities (Guardian, 2016; Washington Post, 2016). These 
findings are remarkable but there is an important difference between the two sets of data. 
I was curious to see how the inclusion of data from deaths attributed to police but 
not caused by the intentional use of deadly force by police officers during the execution 
of public duties affected the overall findings. I reviewed the 2016 New Jersey cases from 
the Guardian and the Washington Post but found only a small disparity. A single case, 
equating to seven percent of all deaths, did not involve officers acting under the color or 
their official duties. This case involved an alleged murder committed by an off-duty 
police officer. However, the 2015 data provided a better example of how including deaths 
attributed to other than official duties obscures the force phenomena. For 2015, the 
Guardian indicated that New Jersey police officers killed 23 people (39% White, 39% 
Black, 3% Hispanic, 4% Asian/Pacific Islander, and 4% unknown) while The Washington 
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Post showed 15 deaths (47% White, 27% Black, 20% Hispanic, and 7% unknown) 
attributed to police shootings (Guardian, 2015; Washington Post, 2015). All deaths 
captured by The Washington Post were captured by the Guardian. Among the 
Guardian’s reported deaths were two traffic accidents involving an on-duty police 
officer, one traffic accident involving an off-duty police officer, one murder involving an 
off-duty corrections officer, and one murder by an off-duty police officer. These five 
deaths in the Guardian’s 2015 reporting fail to provide a link between sworn police 
officers fulfilling their public duties and the intentional use of deadly force, or roughly 
21% of the 2015 reported deaths in New Jersey. Such disparity reveals an urgent need to 
create a consistent conceptualization and operationalization of force in order to separate 
that construct from other data purported to be police killings. 
Two online newspapers have offered methods for readers to examine variables 
present in scholarly research. The data collected by The Guardian showing the number of 
police killings can be filtered into categories, such as gender, race, age, and the presence 
of a weapon. The data can be further filtered by state and classification of death, such as 
gunshot or struck by a vehicle. Police shooting data from the Washington Post can be 
further subdivided into two additional categories, signs of mental illness and threat level 
but cannot filter on a classification of death. Most of the variables collected by these two 
news organizations have been extensively examined in scholarly research. Notably, 
absent from their list of variables is a level of the suspect’s resistance, described later in 
this chapter, which has been found to be a significant influence on force outcomes. 
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The measurement of the deadly force phenomenon is difficult and contentious but 
the measurement non-deadly force is virtually absent but equally controversial. Fryer 
(2016) explained that data on non-deadly force is nearly non-existent because many 
agencies simply do not collect the data or simply let it exist within narrative police 
reports where it is difficult to extract. One option for overcoming the data collection 
problem from police agencies is by analyzing the Police-Public Contact Survey (PPCS) 
available from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (2011). This survey is collected every 3 
years as a supplement to the National Crime Victimization Survey using a sample of 
people aged 16 and older who answer questions related to any type of police contact 
within the previous 12 months (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2011). In analyzing the data 
from 2002, 2005, 2008, and 2011, Hyland, Langton, and Davis (2015) found an annual 
average of 715,500 non-deadly force incidents, including all threats of force by an 
officer, as well as instances where force was actually used. The PPCS has several 
disadvantages: (a) data cannot be disaggregated to smaller geographic areas, (b) there is 
an absence of contextual information, (c) jailed individuals and those under 16 years of 
age are omitted, and (d) the data only provide the civilian interpretations of the encounter 
(Fryer, 2016; Hyland et al., 2015). Additionally, the PCS does not draw distinctions 
between coercive threats and actual force. While the PPCS provides an estimate of the 
extent of non-deadly force, that estimate may be misleading due to its loose 
conceptualization and operationalization of non-deadly force and its several 
disadvantages. 
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The prior discussion reflects remarkable problems in collecting data on both non- 
and deadly force. As I have shown, national efforts to gauge the frequency of deadly 
force data have been fragmentary and confusing at best, and efforts to gauge non-deadly 
force is nearly nonexistent. As will be described in more detail later, the policies of the 
State of New Jersey overcome these data collection problems and makes force use by 
police quantifiable on several levels. This study was the first to collect data on both types 
of force to assess the influence of public policy using a conceptualization and 
operationalization of force that is consistent between the researcher and the officers 
carrying out public policy. 
Problems Analyzing Collected Data 
The extent of the national use of force phenomenon and questions of racial 
implications are currently a matter of best-educated guesses. Efforts to calculate the 
degree of racial profiling in any act of police discretion is complicated by the lack of a 
method for measuring racial and ethnic proportions (Alpert, Smith, & Dunham, 2004; 
Ramirez, McDevitt, & Farrell, 2000; Sekhon, in press; Withrow & Williams, 2015). 
Many researchers have attempted to gauge racial profiling in policing, with principal 
strategies involving analyses of traffic stops (Gelman, Fagan, & Kiss, 2007; Walker, 
2001a, 2003). Two common methods from these studies can be used to analyze force data 
for evidence of RIP, external and internal benchmarking. 
External benchmarking compares outside data to collected data. The most 
frequently used external benchmark to gauge racial disparities is the residential 
population of the police jurisdiction (Engel & Calnon, 2004; Withrow & Williams, 
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2015). Researchers have compared the frequency of stops, searches, arrests, and force in 
relation to the proportion of racial groups in the local residential population (Bejarano, 
2001; Gelman et al., 2007; Goff, Lloyd, Geller, Raphael, & Glaser, 2016; Penn, 2006; 
Smith & Petrocelli, 2001; Verniero & Zoubek, 1999; Zingraff et al., 2000). Also, census 
data are frequently the benchmark provided in news analysis (see Craven, 2016; Sager, 
2016; Swain, Laughland, Lartey, & McCarthy, 2015), although such research has been 
criticized for failing to account for transient populations, differential rates of exposure to 
police, differential rates of offending, and undocumented residents (Ayers, 2002; Cox, 
Pease, Miller, & Tyson, 2001; Horn et al., 2013; Simoiu, Corbett-Davies, & Goel, 2016; 
Walker, 2001a; Withrow & Williams, 2015; Zingraff et al., 2000). These failings may 
result in findings lacking in validity and which may influence the perceptions that police 
unfairly treat racial minorities. As a result of these difficulties, research has begun to shift 
toward internal benchmarking methods (Tillyer & Engel, 2010). 
Internal benchmarking compares collected data from one unit of measure to 
similarly situated other units of measure within the study. The underlying assumption of 
internal benchmarking in policing is that similarly situated officers will perform similarly 
because they are exposed to the same contextual environment (Walker, 2003; Withrow & 
Williams, 2015). Those who differ from the others are considered anomalies requiring 
additional attention. This type of research is an outcomes-based assessment that analyzes 
differences in police performance among officers (e.g., warnings, summonses, searches, 
and arrests). Many police agencies have begun to use this type of benchmarking as part of 
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an internal affairs early intervention system to monitor for problem officers, such as the 
Pittsburgh and Cincinnati police departments (Walker, 2003). 
Internal benchmarking has several advantages over external benchmarking but 
still has important limitations. Internal benchmarking does not introduce measurement 
error, such as those relating to transient populations; accounts for differential rates of 
exposure to police; and is effective at identifying officers who behave differently from 
others (Withrow & Williams, 2015). However, internal benchmarking suffers from two 
failings. First, it is difficult to operationalize similarly situated officers, as officers may be 
tasked to handle service calls outside their assignment or temporarily redeployed to 
different assignments. Second, internal benchmarking is unable to identify misconduct, 
such as racial profiling, if the conduct is rampant or systemic. 
Internal benchmarking does not lend itself to the creation of a simple headline 
figure, but rather involves constant qualitative comparison among calculated statistics. 
Evaluators are free to utilize a broad degree of latitude in using factors for comparison. 
Policing is generally considered a local issue, a thought supported by a recent study that 
noted “precincts matter,” and such small units of measurement are important to data 
analysis for RIP (Fryer, 2016, p. 17; Pollock, Oliver, & Menerd, 2012; Ridgeway & 
MacDonald, 2013). Internal benchmarking offers promise in assessing the propensity of 
racial profiling and is useful in nuanced reviews of force by tailoring the analysis to local 
needs. By reviewing contextual details, evaluators can better decide the tactical, legal, 
and moral appropriateness of force use and make policy changes appropriate for local 
needs.  
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Rule Makers 
The makeup of the U.S. government provides many layers of rule makers. Each 
branch of government at each level of government can create administrative rules that 
police agencies must follow (Skogan & Meares, 2004). Even the demands of insurance 
agencies cause rules that must be followed by police agencies (Rappaport, 2016). In this 
section, I address the five rule makers most influential to this study. 
The Judicial System 
The judicial system provides administrative rules that govern many police 
activities. Through federal, state, and local court decisions, also known as case law, 
police actions are deemed legal and proper or improper and the decision is binding upon 
all agencies within the courts’ jurisdiction. For the purpose of this study, these decisions 
are considered rules because agencies must react to the decisions by ensuring all future 
officer actions conform with the decision. The decisions of the court are based on broad 
legal concepts often focused on specific officer behaviors. Sometimes these rulings help 
make matters clear and sometimes they do not. 
The Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) established the baseline 
standards used to guide police officer uses of force in the nation through case law in 
Tennessee v. Garner (1985) and Graham v. Connor (1989) and have been adopted in full 
by the New Jersey Supreme Court. SCOTUS recognized that officers are “… often forced 
to make split-second judgments — in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly 
evolving — about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation” (Graham 
v. Connor, 1989, p.  3). The Court did not go as far as to require officers’ judgements to 
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be right, but it did require that officers use objectively reasonable force given the totality 
of the circumstances. The Court did not stop there, it further offered a method by which 
to determine if force used was excessive. 
Garner and Graham began the objective reasonableness standard by which the 
actions of officers were to be judged in official legal proceedings. The Court rejected the 
notion that claims of excessive force could be evaluated by a single generic standard. 
Instead, the force used must be evaluated under a reasonableness standard requiring a “… 
careful balancing of " `the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth 
Amendment interests' " against the countervailing governmental interests at stake” 
(United States v. Place as cited in Graham v. Connor, 1989, p. 2). In the course of 
balancing the intrusion against government interests, one must consider severity of the 
crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers 
or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight 
(Graham v. Connor, 1989). Such an evaluation must consider the force used by an officer 
“… from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 
vision of hindsight [and] without regard to their underlying intent or motivation” 
(Graham v. Connor, 1989, p.  3). Some have argued that the standard is not very 
objective. Terrill and Paoline (2016) asserted that the objective reasonableness standard 
provides an ambiguous threshold. The ambiguity results from the subjective nature of the 
word reasonable. Black’s Law Dictionary defines reasonable as “agreeable to reason; 
just; proper, [or] ordinary or usual” (Law dictionary, n.d.-a). Other sources provide 
similar and equally arguable definitions. The required reliance on personal opinions 
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makes it difficult to distinguish reasonable force from excessive force (Alpert & Smith, 
1994). While reasonableness is much more easily deduced when life-threatening dangers 
clearly exist, it is more difficult to conclude when they clearly do not. Claims that the 
objective reasonableness standard is equivocal are justified. However, these claims 
support the Supreme Court’s notion that a single generic standard cannot be used to 
evaluate officer uses of force. Each individual act of force must be evaluated on its own 
merits. Within the court system, allegations of excessive force are reviewed in state 
criminal and tort litigation or federal criminal suites under 18 U.S.C. § 242 and civil suits 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The findings of these cases further develop the reasonableness 
standard and inform officers of the actions that might be deemed excessive in similar 
circumstances. 
The objective reasonableness standard lends itself to differences in perceptions 
between the public and police and might be one cause of the public’s diminished trust in 
the police. The objective reasonableness standard offered by the Court is very different 
from the standards offered by many in the popular media and crowdsourced accounting 
mechanisms described earlier. What the courts consider reasonable may be deemed 
excessive by a citizen, force which is often referred to as lawful but awful. To complicate 
matters, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the objective reasonableness 
standard removes any need to consider the subjective officer intentions, such as racially 
biased motivations (Scott v. United States, 1978; United States v. Robinson, 1973; Whren 
v. United States, 1996). As long as the totality of the circumstances presents an 
objectively reasonable reason to use force, subjective motivations are unimportant. Chin 
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and Vernon (2015) argued that the standard endorses racial discrimination. Cooper 
(2015) found this fact especially troubling because of the potential it gives to racially-
biased officers to commit murder without the fear of being held accountable. E. J. Miller 
(2015) argued the individualized focus of the objectively reasonable standard would not 
capture larger issues related to distributive justice. While the standard is the strict legal 
threshold to hold officers accountable for their actions, there are concerns by some that 
the threshold is too high and too deferential to police. 
U.S. Department of Justice 
For the purpose of this study, among the greatest influences on New Jersey police 
policies was the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. DOJ. That division sued the State of 
New Jersey under the authority of 42 USC § 14141. This code allows the U.S. Attorney 
General (USAG) to sue police agencies when there is a reason to believe that officers are 
engaged in a pattern or practice of depriving people of their constitutional rights with the 
purpose to bring about organizational reforms that establish standards of accountability to 
prevent future occurrences (Walker & MacDonald, 2008).  
In 1999, the New Jersey State Police (NJSP) entered into a Consent Decree with 
the USAG that later became a cornerstone for the New Jersey RIP policy. The decree 
settled the pattern or practice lawsuit alleging that the NJSP failed to adopt and 
implement management practices to control officer discretion by allowing officers to 
target minority drivers and passengers for enforcement actions. Among the many parts of 
the agreement were stipulations that (a) officers of the NJSP would not be allowed to use 
race or ethnicity in decisions to conduct traffic stops or conduct post-stop action; (b) 
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NJSP officers would document the race, ethnicity, gender, the reasons for all traffic stops 
and all post-stop actions; (c) NJSP supervisors would review officer traffic stop reports 
and mobile video recordings to ensure compliance and to make recommendations for 
training and discipline as needed; and (d) oversight would be provided by an Office of 
State Police Affairs, the NJOAG, and an independent monitor (United States v. State of 
New Jersey, Division of State Police, 1999). The documented successes that resulted 
from this decree served as a model for the RIP directive established by the NJOAG 
(2005a). 
The New Jersey Legislature 
Legislated laws are another way to control the actions of police officers. The New 
Jersey legislature has outlawed the deprivation of civil rights by public officials (N.J. 
Stat. Ann. 2C:30-2). Enforcement of this statute falls to the charge of official misconduct, 
where a public servant knowingly injures or deprives another through an unauthorized act 
relating to the exercise of their public office, or by refraining from performing a duty 
imposed by law (N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:30-2). In the case of RIP, the official misconduct 
charge is considered a crime with a presumption of imprisonment; a mandatory minimum 
term of five years and a maximum term of 10 years (N.J. Stat. Ann. 43:6-5). Where two 
or more acts are alleged under official misconduct, there is an additional offense known 
as patterns of official misconduct (N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:30-7). The patterns of official 
misconduct charge is also a crime with a presumption of a prison sentence, but upon 
conviction cannot be merged with convictions for other offenses, such as official 
misconduct, ensuring that the official serves additional time in prison for the pattern 
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offense (N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:30-7). These enactments were created to prevent racial 
profiling and when necessary to punish those offenders.   
The New Jersey Office of the Attorney General 
The New Jersey Attorney General is authorized to implement a statewide policy 
for both the police and prosecution functions. The Criminal Justice Act of 1970, declares 
the Attorney General to be the chief law enforcement officer for the state (N.J. Stat. Ann. 
52:17B-97 et seq.). The Act prescribes an integrated and hierarchical system of law 
enforcement acting under the direction of the attorney general. This system is unusual in 
the nation as most other states keep the prosecution function separate from the police 
function (County Prosecutor Study Commission, 2011). However, the system ensures the 
most efficient and effective use of criminal justice resources throughout the State (County 
Prosecutor Study Commission, 2011). Two NJOAG regulations specifically influence 
this study. 
Racially-influenced policing directive. The NJOAG (2005a) RIP directive (see 
Appendix A) established the first-in-the-nation statewide policy regarding the use of race 
and ethnicity in police actions. This policy conforms with the Davis rule model and adds 
a one-time pre-service and in-service training requirement using a material produced by 
the New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice. Officer discretion is confined and structured 
in this written policy that unequivocally declares that no officer will use the race or 
ethnicity of an individual as a factor when drawing inferences or conclusions of 
involvement in criminal activity or as a factor in the exercise of discretion in stopping or 
treating a person, including when choosing to use force. Officers are still permitted to use 
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race and ethnicity when used to describe physical characteristics identifying a particular 
individual being sought or investigated in the furtherance of an investigation. Officer 
discretion is checked through the review of officer incident reports and behavior. This is 
a policy weakness foreseen by Lipsky (2010), as supervision may be insufficient or 
ineffective at spotting problem officers. Agencies are left to develop the standards and 
mechanisms to find those problem officers without guidance from the state. 
Use of force policy. The NJOAG (2000) use of force policy (see Appendix B) 
sets the standard for both non- and deadly force. The directive follows the SCOTUS 
objective reasonableness standard and the Davis rule model for confining, structuring, 
and checking officer discretion. Discretion is confined and structured through this written 
policy enunciating authorizations and limits to the use of non- and deadly force and the 
display of firearms. Discretion is checked through mandated reporting requirements. 
Also, officers are required to receive training on this policy at least twice per year. The 
policy is a mixture of good and bad with regard to resolving the previously described 
problems of conceptualization, operationalization, and measurement. 
 The Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy unintentionally helps to confuse the 
matter of force conceptualization found elsewhere. The title alone confounds that issue 
but is supplemented with other obscuring components. This is because the force policy 
includes both coercion and force but offers no definition for either, and includes a force 
continuum with elements of both. The continuum devised by the state includes, (a) 
constructive authority, (b) physical contact, (c) physical force, (d) mechanical force, and 
(e) deadly force. Constructive authority and physical contact are exclusively coercive 
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while physical, mechanical, and deadly force are exclusively forceful. The obscurity of 
force is an unfortunate matter that can and should be rectified so that a simple reading of 
the policy can serve as a foundation for mutual understanding between the public and the 
police.   
Despite the conceptualization problem found in the policy, information located in 
the policy and various state laws can be combined to make plain the definition of force 
and resolve uncertainty involving in its operationalization. Using the policy and laws, 
force is deduced to be the lawful physical actions undertaken by police officers to protect 
persons or property or to overcome suspect resistance during the execution of their public 
duties that intentionally or unintentionally attempt or inflict physiological harm, 
impairment, or death (NJOAG, 2000; N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:1-14[b]; 2C:3-3 et seq.; 2C:3-7 
et seq.; 2C:11-1 et seq.). Given this definition of force, its operationalization is made 
clear by the policy in the form of the force continuum. However, it is important to note 
that the levels on the continuum do not represent sequential steps that must be followed 
but are rather a range of options from which the office can choose based on the 
circumstances presented. There is no expectation that officers will exhaust lower level 
options before resorting to higher levels of force. 
The policy overcomes the problem of measurement and permits practitioners and 
policymakers to know precisely the number of non- and deadly force incidents that occur 
in New Jersey. In an effort to check officer discretion, the policy requires that officers 
submit reports through their chain of command for every instance in which physical, 
mechanical, or deadly force was used. Assuming that all forceful incidents are properly 
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reported, not only can the incident be quality reviewed by a supervisor or other entity, but 
the frequency of all types of force used by officers can be easily measured at the local 
level in real-time. Subsequent mandatory aggregate reporting to the county prosecutor 
will make the frequency of force known at the county level on a regular basis. While the 
policy does not specify other mandatory notifications of force, except in incidents 
involving serious bodily injury or when any injury is caused by a firearm, it is 
conceivable that a mechanism could constructed so that the extent of the force 
phenomena within the state could be regularly quantified. Since it is possible to collect 
and make know the frequency of force to practitioners and policymakers, this information 
should be publicly and regularly published to increase police transparency and 
accountability in the hopes of improving public trust and police legitimacy. 
The policy does leave room for other areas of improvement. First, agencies are 
permitted to customize the form officers complete when reporting uses of force (see 
Appendix A), and based on the data collected for this study, do not require that they be 
completed in full. This could make data collection of certain variables difficult and 
complicate comparisons among agencies, as it did in my study. Second, the policy 
proposes no required assessment of the data, at any level of government, once they are 
collected and reported. Finally, it offers no suggested algorithm to turn the data into 
meaningful information. Such tasks are left to the individuals and agencies who see those 
data. If included, these elements might help with issues of accountability, transparency, 
public trust, and legitimacy. 
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New Jersey Police Agencies 
Police agencies may also enact rules to control officer discretion and behavior. 
Agency heads, known as appropriate authorities, are authorized under current and valid 
municipal ordinances to adopt rules and regulations for the government and discipline of 
its officers (N.J. Stat. Ann. 40A:14-118). The NJOAG (2001) requires that the rules and 
regulations be supplemented with policies and procedures. The rules define acceptable 
and unacceptable officer behavior in broad terms, while policies and procedures are 
detailed statements on how to accomplish job-related tasks for police operations. For 
example, a rule might require officers to wear a particular uniform while engaged in 
certain assignments while the precise details of that uniform would be expressed in the 
policies and procedures. Under no circumstances may agency rules become less 
restrictive than those of their higher authorities. To illustrate this point, my data 
collection revealed that several agencies promulgated their own RIP directives prior to 
the state mandate, choosing to establish a rule more restrictive than required. This 
observation will be described in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
Administrative Rules Influence Police Behavior 
During the police reform movement of the 1960s, the President’s Crime 
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1967) noted that police 
agencies are not accustomed to their roles as policy-makers. The commission 
recommended that police agencies develop and promulgate policies to guide officer 
discretion during common situations involving the exercise of discretion and that the 
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public is apprised in advance of the policy. Later research would confirm the utility of 
rules governing police discretion. 
Police agencies have successfully used rules to control the use of discretion by 
their officers. Still, rules to control police discretion are a relatively new development 
occurring mostly over the last 30 years beginning with examinations of rules restricting 
deadly force (White, 2011). Prior to the 1970s, few departments had rules to control 
deadly force, and those that existed had little impact on officer actions (U.S. President's 
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1967). Officers 
followed the common law fleeing felon doctrine which permitted officers to shoot any 
suspected felon to prevent their escape (Walker, 1993; White, 2001). When agencies did 
provide rules for deadly force, they did so with ambiguous statements and language, such 
as requiring the use of good judgment and admonitions not to unholster their weapon in 
anger (Walker, 1993; White, 2001). Public discord from several high-profile police 
shootings created an environment that increased professional, government, and scholarly 
examinations of police deadly force and the use of policies to confine officer discretion. 
Few other professions have been granted the degree of discretion as police, and 
with the exception of the military, no other profession has been granted the range of 
discretion to exercise force alternatives. Rules provide written guidance and the 
annunciation of expectations (Thibault, Lynch, McBride, & Walsh, 1998). Rules are 
intended to reduce discretion and help officers prepare for the situations they might 
encounter (Alpert & Fridell, 1992; Walker, 1993). The vein of scholarly research that has 
explored the use of rules in policing has shown consistently that rules do constrain police 
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actions, even during critical life-threatening events. Still, authors are steadfast in their 
warning that rules must be clear, unambiguous, and supported by meaningful supervision 
and discipline.  
Walker and Archbold (2014) recommended that agencies develop policies to 
control police discretion in critical incidents, defined as those events involving police 
actions that pose a risk to life, liberty, and the dignity of a person. The list of possible 
critical incidents is potentially endless, so the following portion of the literature review 
will explore the more prominent critical issues that pose risks to life, liberty, and dignity 
of a person. 
Rules Reduce Deadly Force 
Research on the ability of rules to control police discretion began with James 
Fyfe, a New York City police officer and future deputy commissioner, who examined the 
influence of the department’s deadly force policy. The New York City Police Department 
was among the first in the nation to attempt controlling police discretion in using deadly 
force as a matter of policy. The policy conformed with the Davis (1975) rule model. 
Among the controls were (a) a mandate to use the defense of life standard, (b) certain 
prohibitions on the use of firearms, (c) a requirement to complete a firearms discharge 
report, (d) the review of all firearms discharges by a review board, and (e) listing of 
possible sanctions for failure to conform with the policy (New York City Police 
Department, 1972). Fyfe (1979) found the policy helped reduce firearms discharges by 
29.9% over the first four years, suggesting that the policy aided in constraining 
discretion. Significantly, the policy appeared to have no adverse impacts, such as 
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increases in officer assaults or increases in the crime rate. Later research by Fyfe (1980; 
1981, 1982, 1988), Walker (1993), and White (2000, 2001, 2003) confirmed the efficacy 
of restrictive rules on deadly force in other large cities. The effects of the rules, however, 
are nuanced, as they influence non- and elective shooting differently (White, 1999). The 
results of this research were persuasive, leading to a national trend among police agencies 
to enact similar deadly force policies (Walker, 1993). Walker suggested that the success 
of restrictive deadly force policies should serve as a model for other efforts to control 
police behavior. 
Rules Reduce Non-Deadly Force 
Unlike the deadly force research, the influence of policy on the use of less-lethal 
force has not been thoroughly examined. A wealth of research has examined the structure 
of rules, training, tactics, reporting, audits, and the force continuum (Alpert, Dunham, & 
MacDonald, 2004; Bishopp, Klinger, & Morris, 2014; Hough & Tatum, 2012; McEwen, 
1997; Pate & Fridell, 1993; 1995; Terrill & Paoline III, 2012). Other researchers have 
examined the relationship of less-lethal policy on the use of deadly force (Ferdik, 
Kaminski, Cooney, & Sevigny, 2014; Morabito & Doerner, 1997; Thomas, Colins, & 
Lovrich, 2010). Until recently, studies did not examine the influence of policy on the use 
of a spectrum of less-lethal force options. 
Terrill and Paoline (2016) provided the first study to assess the influence of policy 
on the use of a range of less-lethal options. The authors reviewed force incidents from 
three agencies with different degrees of policy. Controlling for situationally-based 
factors, Terrill and Paoline found that more restrictive policies resulted in less force and 
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less restrictive policies resulted in more force. It is interesting to note that the department 
with the most restrictive policy also had the greatest number of officers and citizens, and 
the highest crime rate. The results of this study offer a foundation for future studies and 
provide promise that administrative rules may help achieve less forceful outcomes. 
Rules Reduce Vehicle Pursuits 
While somewhat glorified or sensationalized in the movies, television, and news 
media, the pursuit of fleeing vehicles presents unintended but foreseeable risks of injury 
or death and are a matter for public concern. Like deadly and non-deadly force, officers 
were generally unrestricted in their pursuit-related decisions until the 1980s (Alpert & 
Dunham, 1989; Walker & Archbold, 2014). Pursuits are an active attempt by police to 
apprehend an occupant of a moving vehicle who deliberately resists that apprehension 
through the continued use of the vehicle (Fennessey, as cited by Nugent, Connors, 
McEwen, & Mayo, 1989). They expose the officers, suspect, and the public to loss of life, 
serious injury, and significant property damage (Nugent et al., 1989). Without many 
substantive data to support the notion, early policy discussions considered pursuits more 
frequent than deadly force incidents and as a result of changes in deadly force, considered 
creating policies for pursuits. 
The literature involving the influence of restrictive policies on pursuit is scant. 
Much of the research on the topic has examined the factors leading to decisions to pursue, 
structural components of policy, the amount of force used after a pursuit ended, but 
mostly centering on the danger of pursuits (Hicks, 2006). Research on rules began with 
Nugent et al. (1989), whose study was hampered by poor pre-policy pursuit data, as was 
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common among the police community. Although the data were poor, the authors were 
able to determine a trend that seemed to indicate a decrease in pursuit frequency after the 
implementation of the policy. Later research conducted with better data also found 
restrictive policies reduced pursuits (Becknell et al., 1999; Crew et al, 1995). While the 
literature is not as robust in this area, the existing literature shows promise that rules 
effectively reduce officer discretion during these critical incidents. 
Value of Rules Governing Racial Profiling Is Inconclusive 
Beliefs that police engage in racial profiling is at the heart of the trust problem 
between the public and police. The view that officers engage in such behavior threatens 
the principle of fair and equal treatment under the law. The 1990s presented the political 
tipping point as public concerns increased social and political pressures to stop the 
phenomenon (Warren & Tomaskovic-Devey, 2009). Since then, numerous agency and 
scholarly examinations have been made to determine if police agencies engage in RIP, 
particularly during traffic stops, searches, and arrest. Studies have shown that Blacks are 
disproportionately stopped, searched, and arrested in proportions greater than their 
representation in the general population (Engel & Johnson, 2006; Parker, MacDonald, 
Alpert, Smith, & Piquero, 2004; Skolnick, 2007), while other researchers have found the 
opposite or mixed results (Engel et al., 2005; Novak, 2004; Smith & Petrocelli, 2001). 
While studies quantifying the phenomenon are plentiful, studies examining the influences 
of policy are not.   
Despite the attention given to the racial profiling problem, little attention has been 
given to police agencies policy responses (K. Miller, 2009). Of particular note is the 
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dearth of information related to the effectiveness of policies intended to prohibit RIP. 
Two studies were found that address the topic in limited fashion. Shultz and Withrow 
(2004) sought to determine the operational influence of officer-generated forms during 
race-based policing studies but found that neither the reports nor the study had an 
influence on organizational changes. They postulated that racial profiling has not 
developed traction among police agencies and that many agencies may enact RIP 
prohibitions as a symbolic gesture in response to social and political demands. In a more 
significant study, Warren and Tomaskovic-Devey (2009) conducted a time-series 
analysis of the North Carolina Highway Patrol interdiction team between 1997-2000 
using agency collected data. They sought to measure searches and successful searches 
before and after the enactment of the North Carolina law requiring police to collect 
specific racial data during traffic stops. The results showed that the law significantly 
reduced racial disparities in traffic stops, decreased the use of consent searches, and 
increased the probability of finding contraband during the searches. The scarcity of 
studies on the topic has not helped determine the value of RIP prohibitions, but in this 
study I contributed to that literature. 
Challenges Posed by the Findings in the Use of Force Literature  
In the previous sections, I addressed limitations related to data collection and 
analysis of police uses of force, the effectiveness of rules in constraining police discretion 
during critical incidents, and the New Jersey rules and rule makers as background for this 
study. Recent uses of force by police on racial minority members throughout the nation 
has caused numerous protests and calls for police reforms from the public and elected 
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officials (Weitzer, 2015). Recent opinion polls have found public confidence in the police 
to be at an all-time low with many believing that officers do not fairly treat racial 
minority members (Jones, 2015; Pew Research Center, 2014). The publics’ lack of trust 
in the police damages the legitimacy and authority of the police and government, and 
threatens the quality of life of all citizens, particularly communities comprised of racial 
minority populations (Keita, 2014; Meares et al., 2014; Nix et al,, 2014; Rahr & Rice, 
2014; Richardson, 2015; White House, 2014). Administrative rules offer an opportunity 
to promote that trust by constraining police actions detrimental to the public trust but 
their effectiveness in eliminating RIP is unclear. In this study, I examined the relevant 
data to determine if the New Jersey RIP directive is effective at stopping racial disparities 
in uses of force by police. 
An integral part of this study is the review of the findings of previous police use 
of force studies. Unfortunately, the findings of the extant literature present challenges to 
understanding that concept for two reasons. First, few studies conceptualize force in the 
same manner while some provide no conceptualization. This was an issue that Garner et 
al. (1995) attempted to overcome by offering a model definition that was limited to 
intentional threats, attempts, and infliction of physical harm. Second, the majority of 
studies operationalize force in different ways, leaving this field of research without a 
consistent list of actions that constitute force. In some cases, this was because of 
dissimilar force continuums. Agency force continuums widely differ across the nation 
(Klahm IV & Tillyer, 2010; Terrill & Paoline III, 2012). As a result, verbal commands 
and physical contact might be considered force at one agency while not in another. These 
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issues lead to the question, have police uses of force changed over time, or have actions 
considered force been broadened? The lack of consistency in both conceptualization and 
operationalization confounds the construct of force and makes a comparison of findings 
across studies difficult. 
Force in this study is conceptualized in the manner stricter than that provided by 
Garner et al. (1995) who included coercion (threats). This study also goes against the 
recommendation of Klahm, Frank, and Liederbach (2014) who, after examining the 
conceptualization of force across many studies, supported the use of the Garner definition 
in future research. I chose to do this as a practical matter to align with the state policy. 
The definition for this study was chosen because it reflects the laws and policies of New 
Jersey which are taught to police officers in the police academy and in-service training. 
This study is not intended to measure nonviolent acts of coercion, and, as such, it is 
similar to those who have studied police use of violence by examining official 
government records (see Crown & Adrion, 2011; Hoffman & Hickey, 2005; Johnson, 
2011; Morabito & Doerner, 1997). My decision to use a stricter definition is supported by 
in the writings of Garner et al. 
Garner et al. (1995) asserted that their conceptualization of force, based on the 
National Academy of Sciences definition of violence, was simply to serve as a substitute 
where no precise definition existed. They chose this definition because it “did a good job 
in capturing what the research literature on police use of force typically means by 
‘force’” (Garner et al., 1995, p. 152). Their research was not concerned with creating a 
definition of force but rather with developing measures of the nature and extent of force 
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used by and against police officers that had been discussed in prior studies. The authors 
conceded that the presence of a heavily armed individual might be thought of as 
inherently threatening and could be considered forceful thus transforming all police-
citizen encounters into forceful incidents. This conceptualization would be better named 
police coercion, of which force would be a subset. The title change would align with 
common and legal definitions of coercion (Law Dictionary, n.d.-b). It would also reflect 
the reality that all police-citizen encounters entail the risk of force when civilians resist 
the lawful orders of an officer.  
Data for this study were based on historical and publicly available official 
government records. The New Jersey Use of Force Report must be completed each time 
force is used and releasable under the New Jersey Open Public Records Act (N.J. Stat. 
Ann. 47:1A-1 et seq.). The form offers predetermined checkboxes for officers to indicate 
the presence of factors that led to their use of force and the nature of the force that was 
applied. It provides only a high-level picture of the incident and does not reflect the 
transactional nature of the police-citizen encounter as had been done in other research 
(Alpert, Dunham, & MacDonald, 2004; Terrill, 2001; 2003). This is unfortunate, as many 
subtleties are lost but which may appear in the officers’ incident reports. Those reports 
are unavailable as they are classified as criminal records and are exempt from public 
disclosure (N.J. Stat. Ann. 47:1A-1.1). While I cannot examine the transactional nature of 
the encounter, such an examination is beyond the scope of this research. Although those 
data would better aid the understanding of each incident, the loss of that contextual data 
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does change the outcome of the incident, which is ultimately the result being studied 
here.  
The variables involved in the transactional nature of the police-citizen encounter 
are important to understanding the context in which force is used. Police have the 
authority and duty to use force to carry out lawful objectives and to protect their lives and 
the lives of others. In doing so, an officer must perceive those variables, tailor a response, 
and then physically respond. Decisions and responses may not be static as new 
information may be observed that requires changes to the initial response. Failure to 
appropriately carry out those mental and physical sequences could lead to unfortunate 
consequences for the officer, the subject, and others. Many of the variables collected on 
the New Jersey use of force report form have been the subject of previous research. Five 
categories of variables that influence police uses of force have been identified in previous 
research, (a) suspect, (b) encounter, (c) officer, (d) neighborhood, and (e) organization. 
The use of force report form collects many but not all studied factors in the suspect, 
officer, and encounter categories. Suspect factors include gender, race, age, weapon, 
intoxication, and resistance. Officer factors include gender, race, age, years of service, 
duty status, and the wear of a uniform. Encounter factors include suspect actions and 
charges, type of incident, and the presence of a weapon. A review of these categories and 
variables is included later in this chapter along with reviews of other studied categories 
and variables not collected on the report form. 
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Sample Force Scenario 
An example scenario can illustrate the interaction of variables influencing officer 
decisions. This scenario represents a degree of realism demonstrating the plethora of 
variables officers might encounter and how events can unpredictably unfold.  
Late one busy night, somewhere in Small-Town U.S.A., in an area known for 
violent crime, two officers are sent to a robbery in progress at a local gas station. The 
dispatcher tells the officers on the police radio that several callers report a man hitting 
and threatening to kill the attendant if he does not give the suspect the money from the 
register and safe. No callers report seeing any weapon. Prior to their arrival, no additional 
information about the events is communicated to the officers. Simultaneously, the 
officers arrive from different directions in their separate patrol cars to see many cars 
blocking the gas pumps, a small crowd of onlookers, and what appears to be a frail man 
in his 70s striking a young and diminutive attendant with open hands. The officers get out 
of their respective cars and in a show of constructive authority announce their presence 
and demand the suspect stop hitting the attendant. Someone yells to the officers that the 
man is drunk. Both officers run to the aid of the attendant. One officer approaches the 
suspect from the front while the other approaches from behind. The suspect stops to look 
at both officers but picks up a window squeegee and proceeds to assault the attendant 
with it. As the front officer closes to 15 feet from the suspect, he uses mechanical force 
by taking out his pepper spray and spraying the suspect. Seemingly unfazed, the frail man 
reaches into his waistband and begins to pull out an object that resembles a handgun. The 
man then shouts to the officer in the front, “Time to die, cop!” Believing it to be a 
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functional and loaded handgun that the subject intends to shoot, that officer yells, “Gun!” 
to alert his partner while simultaneously moving to a nearby position of cover that offers 
a small degree of protection and draws his handgun. Neither officer is close enough to 
use physical force to disarm the man, but, even if they were, the officers know that it 
would be an exceptionally dangerous task in which they might not be successful and 
during which they might get shot. The officer to the front aims his handgun at the man 
but decides he cannot shoot because a missed shot would endanger the crowd of 
onlookers that has gathered behind the man. The officer to the rear does not see the 
handgun but did hear his partner yell that the man had a gun, as he saw his partner 
unholster and point his weapon at the man while moving to cover. Fearing for the life of 
his partner and others, and with no danger to anyone in the background, the officer 
behind the suspect elects to use deadly force by upholstering his weapon, aiming it at the 
suspect, and pulling the trigger.  
This scenario presents a quickly developing set of circumstances in which officers 
moved along a force continuum based upon their observation of the suspect, combined 
with the knowledge and experience officers may gain throughout their careers. Not only 
did they need to consider the variables in their force decisions; they also needed to 
consider factors about whether they could use force without endangering bystanders and 
other officers. This story might seem convoluted, but rarely are use of force incidents so 
straightforward.  
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Factors Contributing to Police Officer Uses of Force 
Suspect characteristics. The characteristics of suspects is an area of literature 
with numerous studies. Researchers have examined factors specific to individual 
suspects, as detailed in the subordinate sections.  
Age. The age of a suspect has not been consistently shown to influence officer 
decisions to use force. Most studies show that age and force use are inversely related 
(McCluskey, Terrill, & Paoline III, 2005; Paoline III & Terrill, 2007; Phillips & Smith, 
2000; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002; Terrill & Reisig, 2003; Terrill et al., 2003). Advancing 
age was found to reduce shows of constructive authority and physical force by male 
officers, and to reduce physical force by female officers (Paoline III & Terrill, 2007). 
Crawford and Burns (1998) found that younger ages were more likely to experience 
physical force but no more likely to experience constructive authority, mechanical force, 
or deadly force. Other studies found age not to be significant or not significant when 
officers respond to domestic disputes (Engel, Sobel, & Worden, 2000; Garner et al., 
2002; Kaminski, Digiovanni, & Downs, 2004; Sun & Payne, 2004). 
Demeanor. Demeanor is a well-studied factor in the literature, but one which has 
produced conflicting results. Suspects exhibiting hostile non-violent demeanor have been 
found to be more likely recipients of force (Engel et al., 2000; Garner et al., 2002; 
Kaminski et al., 2004; Lawton, 2007; Rydberg & Terrill, 2010; Sun & Payne, 2004; 
Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002). Crawford and Burns (1998) found that hostile suspects were 
more likely to receive physical force but no more likely to be subject to constructive 
authority or deadly force. Still, other studies found no effect of demeanor on force 
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(McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; Paoline III & Terrill, 2005; 2007; Terrill, 2005; Terrill & 
Mastrofski, 2002). From a practical perspective, some instances of non-violent but hostile 
demeanor may be lawfully protected speech. Officers who take official actions solely in 
response to lawfully protected speech commit a constitutional violation (Hartman v. 
Moore, 2006). The studies do not make this distinction which complicates interpretations 
of their results. 
Gender. Another of the heavily studies variables, the gender of the suspect has 
shown varied influence on force. Most studies show that officers are more likely to apply 
force to male subjects (Engel & Calnon, 2004; Garner et al., 2002; Kaminski, 
DiGiovanni, & Downs, 2004; McCluskey et al., 2005; McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; 
Phillips & Smith, 2000; Rydberg & Terrill, 2010; Sun & Payne, 2004; Terrill & 
Mastrofski, 2002; Terrill & Reisig, 2003; Terrill et al., 2003). Still, others found a non-
significant relationship between suspects’ gender and force (Engel et al., 2000; Johnson, 
2011; Lawton, 2007). 
Intoxication. Intoxication has been widely researched but offers mixed results. 
Many studies have found intoxication to positively influence officer uses of force (Engel 
et al., 2000; McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; McCluskey et al., 2005; Paoline III & Terrill, 
2007; Rydberg & Terrill, 2010; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002; Terrill et al., 2003, 2008). 
Other studies did not find the relationship significant (Morabito & Doerner, 1997; 
Phillips & Smith, 2000; Schuck, 2004). A meta-analysis by Bolger (2014) found that 
suspect intoxication increases the likelihood of force. 
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Most of these studies suffered from the flaw that they did not differentiate drug-
related intoxication from alcohol-related intoxication. Crawford and Burns (1998) found 
that the type of intoxication influences force differently; alcohol intoxication increases 
the likelihood of constructive authority, and drug intoxication does not. Drug intoxication 
increases the likelihood of nonlethal force; alcohol does not (Garner et al., 2002; Lawton, 
2007; Paoline III & Terrill, 2005; Terrill, 2005). As such, further research is needed on 
the differences between legal and illegal intoxicating substances. 
Mental illness. The realm of police encounters with those suffering from mental 
illness has been researched only modestly. This is unfortunate, as responding to the needs 
of the mentally ill is a routine part of policing (M. S. Morabito, 2007; Walker & 
Archbold, 2014). Police spend as much as 10% of their time handling situations 
involving those with mental illness (Cordner, 2006).Studies have shown that police 
contacts with those believed to have mental illness mostly involved low-level offenses 
and those who infrequently pose a risk of harm to others (Bower & Pettit, 2001; Green, 
1997). Individuals do engage the police with violent or threatening behavior to induce 
officers to kill them, a situation known as suicide-by-cop (American Association of 
Suicidology, 2013; Patton & Fremouw, 2016). Despite the regularity of their interactions, 
many officers acknowledge they do not have sufficient resources or training to address 
those with mental illness (Reuland, Schwartzfeld, & Draper, 2009).  
Few studies exist examining the influence of mental illness on the use of force. 
The studies that have been conducted found no significant relationship between mental 
illness and force (Johnson, 2011; McCluskey et al., 2005; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002). 
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Bolger (2014) attributed these results to the possible relationship mental illness has with 
acts of resistance and drug and alcohol abuse.  
Race. Race has been a heavily studied variable in officer force decisions but the 
body of literature appears inconclusive. There are several studies indicating a positive 
relationship between non-White suspects and force use (Belvedera, Worrall, & Tibbetts, 
2005; Crow & Adrion, 2011; Engel & Calnon, 2004; Hyland et al., 2015; Leinfelt, 2005; 
Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002; Terrill et al., 2003). Fryer (2016) found that Blacks and 
Hispanics were more likely to experience non-deadly force but were no more likely than 
Whites to be subjected to deadly force. Blacks have been found to be more likely to 
experience force when not compliant with officer commands, no more likely when 
offering resistance, and more likely to experience force until the addition of contextual 
neighborhood factors whereupon they are no more likely to experience force than other 
races (Garner et al., 2002; Terrill & Reisig, 2003). Several other studies have indicated no 
significant relationship between race and force (Engel et al., 2000; Lawton, 2007; 
McCluskey et al., 2005; McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; Morabito & Doerner, 1997; Phillips 
& Smith, 2000; Sun & Payne, 2004).  
Social class. Numerous studies have examined the influence of social class on 
police uses of force. Most studies found that lower social class is associated with higher 
uses of force (McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; Paoline III & Terrill, 2007; Terrill & 
Mastrofski, 2002; Terrill et al., 2003; Terrill & Reisig, 2003; Rydberg & Terrill, 2010). 
Terrill (2005) found that social class use of force was dependent on the gender of the 
officer. Still, McCluskey et al. (2005) and Sun and Payne (2004) found no relationship 
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between social class and force. The results of these studies might be considered 
somewhat dubious as race and ethnicity are closely related to social class (Friedrich, 
1980; Hayward, Miles, Crimmins, & Yang, 2000). Additionally, in many studies, the 
measures were based on the perceptions of the observers and subject to possible biases. 
Bolger’s (2014) meta-analysis found that minority males with lower social class were 
more likely to experience force. 
Encounter characteristics. Encounter characteristics are those presented during 
the interaction between the officer and the citizen. These factors are not linked to suspect 
or officer and vary among encounters. 
Arrest. Several studies have been conducted to determine if an officer is more 
likely to use force during an arrest. The research has consistently shown that officers are 
more likely to use force in arrest situations (McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; McCluskey et 
al., 2005; Paoline III & Terrill, 2004; 2007; Terrill et al., 2003). However, the research 
does not indicate if force was used before, during, or after the arrest. This leaves to 
speculation whether the force could be in response to an assault upon the officer, legal 
force necessary to affect an arrest or control a subject, or a potential instance of unlawful 
and excessive force. Additionally, some studies consider procedural actions such as 
handcuffing to be force but which may be required for all arrests per departmental rules. 
While the arrest variable might appear consistent, the results of these studies, on the 
whole, are tenuous. In this study, arrest is not a considered variable because force 
application without an arrest in New Jersey is considered inappropriate in most 
circumstances. 
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Conflict. Conflict is not a well-studied variable and has only appeared in the 
literature in the last several years. Despite the fewer number of studies, the suspect’s 
involvement in a conflict with another person has been found to significantly influence 
force decisions (McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; McCluskey et al., 2005; Paoline & Terrill, 
2007; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002). In other studies, the results were mixed and varied by 
jurisdiction and type of conflict (Paoline III & Terrill, 2005; Terrill et al., 2003). Engel,  
et al. (2000) found no significant influence of the variable. 
Criminal behavior. Criminal behavior has been linked to police uses of force. 
When there is evidence of criminal behavior on the part of the suspect, the likelihood of 
force application is increased (McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; McCluskey et al., 2005; 
Paoline & Terrill, 2007; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002). Like studies of other variables, 
these studies make some interpretation difficult. Criminal behavior is not well defined 
and could include or be counted as another category, such as resistance or proactive 
contact. 
Presence of other officers or citizens. The presence of other officers has become 
a subject of interest over the last several years and the results are mixed. Several studies 
have found that the presence of more officers increased the likelihood for force (Garner et 
al., 2002; Paoline III & Terrill, 2007; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002). Lawton (2007) 
discovered that additional officers reduced the likelihood of force, while Phillips and 
Smith (2000) found a negative relationship only when three or more officers were 
present. Other studies indicated no significant relationship between the factors (Engel et 
al., 2000). Terrill et al., (2003) found that their results were dependent on the location of 
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the incident. From a practical perspective and for reasons of officer safety, more officers 
are typically assigned to more significant incidents or those incidents where violence is 
considered likely or expected. Studies linking the number of officers to increased force 
use did not necessarily account for this practice which may help explain correlations 
between the number of officers and force.  
Like the presence of officers, the presence of citizens is a recent area of study. 
The presence of other citizens has been shown to have no influence on decisions to use 
force (McCluskey, Terrill, & Paoline III, 2005; Paoline III & Terrill, 2005; 2007; Schuck, 
2004; Terrill, 2005; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002; Terrill et al., 2003; Terrill et al., 2008). 
Crawford and Burns (1998) found that the presence of bystanders increased the use of 
physical force but not mechanical or deadly force. Similar to the number of officers, these 
studies have not accounted the reason behind the presence of other citizens. A crowd of 
peaceful onlookers might have a different effect on officer behavior than an unruly crowd 
perceived by the officer to pose a danger. 
Proactive contact. Police officers come into contact with citizens in a variety of 
ways but they typically fall into two categories, citizen-initiated and proactive contact. 
Citizen-initiated contacts result from 9-1-1 calls or other requests for police services, 
such as waving down an officer, an activated burglar alarm, or other means (Selby, 
Singleton, & Flosi, 2016). When officers initiate police actions on their own volition, it is 
considered proactive contact, and the results on its influence in force decisions are mixed. 
Several studies found that proactive contact increased the likelihood of force (Johnson, 
2011; McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; McCluskey et al., 2005; Paoline & Terrill, 2007; 
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Rydberg & Terrill, 2010; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002). Garner et al. (2002), Paoline and 
Terrill (2005), Terrill (2005); and Terrill et al. (2003) found that proactive contact did not 
influence force unless the suspect offered resistance. 
Resistance. Resistance is encountered when a suspect does not comply with 
officer demands. Suspect resistance has been found to increase the likelihood for force 
(Crew & Adrion, 2011; Johnson, 2001; Lee, Jang, Yun, Lim, & Tushaus, 2010; 
McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; McCluskey et al., 2005; Paoline III & Terrill, 2004, 2007; 
Rydberg & Terrill, 2010; Schuck, 2004; Terrill, et al., 2003; Terrill et al., 2008). Only 
one study found no significant relationship between these factors (Lawton, 2007). 
Belverere, Worrall, and Tibbetts (2005) linked suspect race to resistance in their findings 
that indicated Black suspects were more likely to resist than White or Hispanic suspects. 
Finally, Bolger’s (2014) meta-analysis found the resistance increased the likelihood that 
officers will use force. 
Weapon presence. Only a small number of studies have assessed the influence 
the presence of a weapon has on decisions to use force. Various studies have shown a 
positive influence on the presence of a weapon and force usage (Johnson, 2011; 
McCluskey et al., 2005; Paoline & Terrill, 2007; Rydberg & Terrill, 2010; Sun & Payne, 
2004; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002). Mixed results have also been found (Crawford & 
Burns, 1998; Kaminski et al., 2004; Morabito & Doerner, 1997; Terrill et al., 2003). Only 
one study found no significant relationship between weapons and force (McCluskey et 
al., 2005). 
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The weapon variable is fundamental to the public’s confidence problem with the 
police. News media reporting often highlights in article titles when a suspect involved in 
police violence was unarmed or denounces the killing of unarmed people (Black, 2014; 
Brennan, 2016; Domonoske, 2016; Ferner, 2014; Southall, 2015). However, what 
constitutes a weapon is subjective, and the fact that someone is unarmed does not also 
mean that he or she presented no threat to an officer. Someone acting in a menacing 
manner while holding an object that a reasonable officer perceives to be a functional 
weapon is a threat to the officer (Fitzsimmons, 2014; Greene, 2016). Incidents such as 
these have resulted in multiple unfortunate injuries and deaths (Fitzsimmons, 2014; 
Greene, 2016). Someone possessing greater physical qualities or skills may also present a 
threat. For analysts to better understand these incidents, it is important to consider 
contextual factors rather than treating them only as a dichotomous choice between 
unarmed and armed.  
Officer characteristics. Numerous studies have examined the relationship of 
officer characteristics on use of force. These characteristics are specific to the individual 
officer. Unlike encounter characteristics, the research has not found many consistent 
variables. 
Age. The age of an officer is not a well-studied area and remains an inconclusive 
factor in force use. Garner et al. (2002) found that older officers were less likely to use 
force and Hein (2011) found that younger officers were more likely to employ a Taser 
(mechanical force). Crawford and Burns (1998) found no statistically significant 
relationship between age and use of force. 
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Citizen complaints. Research is unclear about the influence of complaints 
regarding officer behavior and use of force. Prior research has found that only a small 
percentage of officers are responsible for the majority of complaints (C. J. Harris, 2008, 
2011; McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; Terrill & Ingram, 2016).  Officers have been found to 
be more likely to receive complaints from proactive encounters, arrests, and felony 
arrests (Brandl, Stroshine, & Frank, 2001; K. M. Lersch, 2002; M. Lersch & 
Mieczkowski, 1996). Terrill and Ingram (2016) found that less experienced officers were 
more likely to receive complaints. McCluskey and Terrill (2005) found a positive 
relationship between complaints and use of force. However, complaints may simply be a 
function of productivity (Brandl et al., 2001; Hassell & Archbold, 2010; K. M. Lersch., 
2002; McCluskey & Terrill, 2005). In some cases, citizens file complaints against 
officers in the hope that the complaint will influence the disposition of their charges. 
There is no indication that complaints equate to a problem officer engaged in misconduct 
or inappropriate behavior. Therefore, this variable might be unreliable because of its 
relationship to other factors. 
Education. Education has been found to be a significant predictor of force use. 
Officers who are most educated have been found to use the least force (Aamodt, 2004; 
McElvain & Kposowa, 2008; Paoline III & Terrill, 2005, 2007; Rydberg & Terrill, 2010; 
Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002). Worden (1995) found officers with a bachelor’s degree or 
higher were more likely to use force. Sun and Payne (2004) and Hein (2011) found a 
nonsignificant relationship between education and force. Interestingly, the results of Lim 
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and Lee (2015) suggest that education may have more influence on force than 
supervision in reducing force use. 
Implicit racial bias. Implicit bias is an area of study spanning well beyond the 
concept of police use of force but in which the criminal justice community has been 
heavily studied. Implicit bias occurs when, although unaware, individuals base their 
decisions to take actions on racially biased motivations (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). 
Using various methods to operationalize racial shooter bias, particularly response times 
and error rates, studies have shown that community members and police officers differ in 
simulated force scenarios. Citizens were found to be quicker to shoot Black subjects than 
officers and did so with more errors than police officers (Correll, Park, Judd, & 
Wittenbrink, 2002; Correll, Hudson, Guillermo, & Ma, 2014; Plant & Peruche, 2005). 
Other studies found that police participants were slower to shoot Black suspects than 
Whites or Hispanics evidencing some favor for racial minority suspects (James, Vila, & 
Daratha, 2012; James, Klinger, & Vila, 2014; James, James, & Vila, 2016). Still, other 
research has indicated no differences in participant reaction times to shoot Black or 
White targets (Harmer, 2012; Taylor, 2011). Cox, Devine, Plant and Schwartz (2014) 
found that police officers were faster to shoot armed Black suspects in pictorial 
depictions and slower in video scenarios but throughout they made few errors regardless 
of race. They found no pattern indicating a tendency for police officers to mistakenly 
shoot unarmed Black suspects more than White suspects. A possible reason is that the 
length of police experience is negatively related to shooting errors (Correll, et al., 2007; 
Peruche & Plant, 2006). 
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Mekawi and Bresin (2015) conducted a meta-analysis of 16 racial shooter bias 
studies involving participants from student and police populations. They acknowledged 
that a cursory review of the literature provided evidence of racial shooter bias but that the 
studies lack common operationalization and offer selective reporting making their 
interpretation difficult. Still, the analysis showed that participants were faster to shoot 
Blacks, slower to decide not to shoot unarmed Blacks, and had a larger shooting bias 
against Blacks. Mekawi and Bresin also found that increased participant contact with 
Blacks was related to the more liberal shooting thresholds against Blacks contrary to 
intergroup contact theory (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). However, the findings of Mekawi 
and Bresin do not necessarily contrast with those of Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) because 
intergroup contact theory has several conditions that could not be addressed in their 
analysis. 
Comparison studies examining differences in responses between civilian samples 
and police officers highlights the distinction between the two groups and offers caution in 
attempts to generalize non-officer responses to the police actions. Research suggests that 
police officers are able to assert cognitive control over their implicit biases (Mekawi & 
Bresin, 2015). While racial shooter bias studies suffer from limitations in the ability to 
generalize across the nation, the results challenge popular notions that implicit bias 
causes officers to shoot Black suspects and may be a factor influencing this study. 
Gender. Many researchers have examined the role of officer gender on uses of 
force, but the results are mixed. Most studies find no significant relationship (Hoffman & 
Hickey, 2005; Lawton, 2007; Rydberg & Terrill, 2010; Paoline & Terrill, 2007; Terrill et 
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al., 2008; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002). Hein (2011) found no significant relationship in 
gender and deployment of a Taser. Johnson (2011) found that males officers are more 
likely to use force, while an older study found that male officers used more severe forms 
of force (Garner et al., 2002). Terill and Paoline (2005) offered a more nuanced set of 
results finding that male officers use higher degrees of force on men and lesser degrees 
on women. Bolger’s (2014) meta-analysis showed that male officers were more likely to 
use force but this finding had a small effect size. 
Race. Officer race and its relationship to force has been the subject of much 
research mostly indicating that there is no relationship between the variables. Several 
studies have failed to find a strong relationship (Engel & Calnon, 2004; Garner et al., 
1995;  Lawton, 2007; Paoline III & Terrill, 2005, 2007; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002). 
Other studies found race to be a significant factor until neighborhood characteristics were 
introduced at which point race became insignificant (Garner et al. 2002; Rydberg & 
Terrill, 2010; Sun & Payne, 2004). Correll, Wittenbrink, Park, Judd, and Goyle (2011) 
conducted a study using university students and found that race and the perceived threat 
of the physical environment combined to influence the use of deadly force in picture and 
video simulations. The Correll et al (2011) study indicated that racial threat perception 
may be one component of a more comprehensive threat-detection process. Similar studies 
have not been conducted using police officers. 
Neighborhood characteristics. Neighborhood characteristic studies include 
some of the earliest that evaluate a relationship with force and generally has discovered 
no significant relationships. One line of study involved neighborhoods perceived as 
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dangerous. Crime rates were associated with greater uses of force (Lee et al., 2010; 
Terrill & Reisig, 2003), although Lawton (2007) failed to find a significant relationship. 
Neighborhoods characterized by a disproportionate number of calls for police service and 
a greater likelihood of suspect resistance also increased the likelihood of force use 
(Alpert et al., 2004). Another line of research involved community income levels. A 
significant relationship was found, but the measure was included in a broader variable 
unrelated to income (McCluskey et al., 2005; Terrill & Reisig, 2003).  
Organization characteristics. Organizational characteristics include culture, 
training, and managerial controls. Cooney (2009) found organizational factors had a 
limited effect of force. Studies have found officers apply less force when the supervisor 
must complete the force report instead of the officer (Alpert & MacDonald, 2001). Active 
supervisors increase the likelihood that officers will use force and will be more likely to 
use force themselves (Engel, 2015). Lim and Lee (2015) found that the education level of 
a supervisor is inversely proportional to the force use of their subordinates. Importantly, 
Lim and Lee found that officers who work for a supervisor without a bachelor’s degree or 
higher will more likely to use force on non-White subjects, while no such relationship 
existed with more highly educated supervisors. Finally, the presence of a supervisor at a 
scene did not have a significant influence on force use (Engel, 2015). 
Summary 
Numerous public opinion polls have indicated an all-time low confidence level in 
police and their ability to fairly treat racial minority populations. This reduced confidence 
coincided with widespread and highly publicized deaths of Black men attributed to police 
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extrajudicial killings (Jones, 2015; Pew Research Center, 2014). However, public opinion 
stands in contrast to established public policies outlawing RIP. Many of the states in 
which highly publicized deaths took place have rules prohibiting RIP (NAACP, 2014). 
Given the allegations that police do not fairly treat minorities, the underlying assertion is 
that officers are not following the rules when fulfilling public policy. 
Rules are common and sometimes broken in police work. Rules provide written 
guidance and the annunciation of expectations to officers (Thibault et al., 1998). Prior 
research has suggested that police agencies are able to control the behavior of their 
officers across a span of police actions through the use of rules (Becknell et al., 1999; 
Crew et al., 1995; Fyfe 1978, 1979; Terrill & Paoline; 2016; Walker, 1993; White, 2000, 
2001, 2003). Additional studies show that most officers follow the rules (C. J. Harris, 
2011; McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; Walker, 2001b). Still, there are instances where 
officers engage in misconduct. SLBT helps explain gaps between the policy and rules to 
the actual behavior of offending officers (Lipsky, 2010). Where racial disparities exist in 
police uses of force, they may be the result of explicit bias or the effect of implicit bias on 
the coping mechanisms created by officers in response to their working environment.  
Prior research associated with police uses of force has had significant limitations. 
Scholarly studies have suffered from inconsistent conceptualizations and 
operationalizations of force (Bolger, 2014; Klahm IV & Tillyer, 2010). Similar 
difficulties are found in media reporting and publicly available databases concerning 
police killings. When frequency data are reported, external benchmarking is the 
predominant form of comparison and the one most used by the media and protest groups 
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(Engel & Calnon, 2004; Withrow & Williams, 2015). However, external benchmarking 
has numerous disadvantages that may lead to inaccurate findings that exacerbate the 
public’s perception that police unfairly treat racial minorities (Cox et al., 2001; Walker, 
2001a; Withrow & Williams, 2015; Zingraff et al., 2000). Inconsistent definitions and 
behaviors constituting force and poor benchmarking make it difficult to gauge the extent 
of the force phenomenon and burden efforts to compare findings across multiple sources. 
Police uses of force have been shown to be the result of a combination of 
numerous variables. For several years, scholars have examined the role of suspect, 
officer, encounter, neighborhood, and organizational characteristics on officer uses of 
force (e.g., Bolger, 2014; Klahm IV & Tillyer, 2010). Many variables have been 
demonstrated to affect force outcomes, particularly those involving the seriousness of the 
crime and resistance (Bolger, 2014). Yet neither the federal government nor the media 
have collected or explained the importance of these factors on force outcomes. The flaws 
in defining force, collecting data, and conducting analysis cloud public discourse and 
complicate attempts to address public policy issues and the problem of public trust in 
police.  
This study overcame the limitations of prior scholarly and popular research to 
examine the influence of rules prohibiting RIP on police uses of force in one New Jersey 
county. First, the conceptualization and operationalization of both RIP and force were 
standardized across participating sites by state law and policy. The definition and actions 
constituting force were aligned with common and legal definitions and were consistent 
with most high-profile incidents which have influenced public confidence in the police. 
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Second, non- and deadly force data was collected through a mandatory reporting 
mechanism established by state policy. Third, that mechanism collected data on several 
variables that have been the subject of previous scholarly research. Finally, I analyzed 
force outcomes for racial disparities using statistical methods that do not suffer from the 
limitations present in benchmarking methods. This study filled the gap in scholarly 
research related to the use of rules to prevent RIP. The findings address the value of such 
rules in controlling police behavior, particularly the influence of rules prohibiting RIP on 
officer uses of force. In Chapter 3, I explain the details of the research design and 
methodology of this study.  
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
I examined the influence of the New Jersey RIP directive on police uses of force 
to determine if it prevents officers from using race as a factor in their decisions and 
whether it is useful as a tool for public administrators. A quantitative retrospective 
analysis of government records documenting police uses of force was used for this 
purpose. The extant literature has shown that administrative rules are effective at 
constraining officer actions during critical incidents involving force (Anderson et al., 
2002; Bishopp et al., 2014; Fyfe, 1978; 1979; Terrill & Paoline III, 2016). If rules are 
effective at preventing RIP, then applying force should not disproportionately affect any 
racial category. 
Chapter 3 provides the quantitative methodology used to examine the influence of 
the RIP directive on officer uses of force. In it, I discuss the statistical designs and 
sampling procedures. I also detail the procedures for data collection, analysis, and threats 
to validity. 
Research Design and Rationale 
A nonexperimental retrospective quantitative design was used to examine the 
influence of the New Jersey RIP directive on documented officer uses of force upon 
people of various races between June 2000 and June 2010 in one New Jersey county. The 
independent variable was the existence or absence of the RIP directive. The dependent 
variable was the highest level of force used by the officer. The independent variable of 
interest was the race of the subject. Numerous variables affect force outcomes. I had 
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intended to control for all factors found on the model use of force reporting form but due 
to imperfections in the collected data, I was required to conduct a binomial logistic 
regression controlling for six factors and an interaction term. The controlled factors were: 
(a) the promulgation of the RIP directive, (b) officer tenure, (c) suspect race, (d) suspect 
age, (e) suspect resistance, and (f) unusual conditions. These factors are described later in 
this chapter. 
The force use examined was bounded by location, employing agency, and time. I 
examined documented municipal police officer uses of force in one New Jersey county. 
Municipal police are the predominant form of policing in the state—the officers with 
whom the public has the greatest contact. Municipal police officers are also differentiated 
from other police officers by statute (N.J. Stat. Ann. 40A:14-152; 40A:14-152.1). 
Therefore, force used by police officers, sheriff’s officers, and corrections officers 
employed by the county, state, and federal agencies that conduct law enforcement 
activities within the county were excluded. Two time periods were examined: June 2000 
to June 2005, after the communication of the New Jersey use of force policy but before 
the RIP directive, and July 2005 to June 2010, after the promulgation of the RIP directive 
and before any policy changes expanding force options were available to officers. 
A data set was created from completed use of force reporting forms. Using 
government records to create this data set was appropriate for three reasons: (a) such 
records provided access to a specific population to which I lacked personal access; (b) 
they provided a large amount of data to examine empirical questions about populations 
that were not anticipated when the data were collected; and (c) there was a strong fit 
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between the data and research question (Fisher & Anushko, 2008). Further, Bazley, 
Lersch, and Mieczkowski (2007) used similar reporting forms during their examination 
of officer force and suspect resistance in an urban police department. Quantitative 
nonexperimental retrospective designs using government records and regression analysis 
have been used in several examinations of public policy involving political economy and 
recidivism, the impact of child passenger safety programs, and the influence of financial 
aid policies on college completion (Everett, 2014; Phillippe, 2012; Ragland, 2016).  
Time and legal constraints were influential in choosing this design. At least 151 
municipal police agencies are located throughout New Jersey’s 8,723 square miles (New 
Jersey State Association of Chiefs of Police, n.d.; U.S. Census Bureau, 2010.). I was the 
only researcher conducting this study and was unable to effectively manage data 
collection from this number of agencies over such a large geographic area to achieve my 
proposed stratified proportionate random sampling method (see the methodology 
section). Moreover, I needed to expeditiously collect data before a potentially devastating 
New Jersey Supreme Court decision that could have limited my access to the needed 
data. Collecting data from one county eased the difficulties associated with data 
collection and permitted me to more speedily collect data before a ruling by the New 
Jersey Supreme Court. 
Resource constraints were also influential in choosing this design. First, to 
conduct this study as an observation would have been impossible. One could not observe 
force use during a time when the RIP directive was not in force, as those years have 
passed. Second, the use of force by police is rare, and the time it would take to do an 
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observational study, particularly with only one researcher, would be prohibitive. 
Therefore, creating a data set from submitted force reporting forms was the most 
achievable and accurate way to conduct this study.  
Methodology 
Population 
The target population for this study was all documented municipal police officer 
uses of force in one New Jersey county between June 2000 and June 2010. I elected to 
use municipalities in only one county to ensure a degree of consistency among the police 
agencies’ rules and practices, which may have affected force outcomes and might 
otherwise have been absent when using municipal agencies from more than one county. 
Consistency in rules and practices was expected because all municipal agencies within 
the county are subject to the authority and oversight of their county prosecutor. Neither 
the state of New Jersey nor the subject county publishes in public forums information 
related to the force used by police officers in that county.  
Sampling Design and Procedures 
I studied a sample of documented uses of force from municipalities in one New 
Jersey county. A sample is a subset of the population used to estimate the characteristics 
of the population (Frankfort-Nachmias et al., 2015; O'Sullivan & Rassel, 2008).  The 
sampling frame for this study was all uses of force within the county that were 
documented by officers employed by the municipal agencies existing within the county 
between June 2000 and June 2010 and whose agency RIP and use of force policies are no 
more restrictive than mandated by the state. The sampling unit was each use of force 
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incident reported by municipal officers within the county during the period being 
examined. I collected a total of 1,274 use of force reports from eight municipalities but 
discovered that only 499 reports from four municipalities satisfied the requirements of 
my study (described later in this chapter). Those 499 reports served as my sampling 
frame. 
I used a probability design and a stratified proportionate random sample. 
Probability designs allow for an equal chance of inclusion in the study for all sampling 
units (Frankfort-Nachmias et al., 2015). Stratified samples ensure that each stratum is 
adequately represented in the sample (Frankfort-Nachmias et al., 2015). I used each 12-
month period of the 10-year study timeframe as a stratum. I selected a random sample of 
force reports from each municipality proportionate to their representation in the 
population size of each stratum. The five strata before the promulgation of the RIP 
directive were combined and analyzed against the combined five strata that came after. 
The sample size for this study was established using the Raosoft (2004) sample-size 
calculator (.05 significance level and a 95% confidence level). These levels are common 
in social science research (Djimeu & Houndolo, 2016). Based on a population estimate of 
499, the required sample for this study was 301, with 123 reports from the pre-RIP period 
and 178 from the post-RIP period. 
Data Collection 
The New Jersey use of force reporting form was used to collect data for this 
study. The latest version was produced by the NJOAG in 2001 (see Appendix A). 
However, previous versions were used over the period studied, which prevented the 
93 
 
collection of data on officer variables (see the discussion on limitations in Chapter 1). 
The reporting form was the most appropriate instrument for this study for four reasons. 
First, unlike other criminal investigatory records, completed use of force reporting forms 
are releasable under the OPRA and readily available for public review. Second, because 
of the mandatory reporting requirements established by law, the form captures all 
reported uses of force by municipal police officers. Third, the instrument established a set 
of variables which have been examined in scholarly research. No other data sources 
provided the consistent breadth of data contained in this instrument.  
Other data collection instruments were considered for this study, but they would 
not have answered the research question. Five other instruments might have provided 
information concerning police officer uses of force, but they each suffer from 
shortcomings, as follows: 
• Arrest reports are publicly releasable under OPRA, but there is no 
prescribed format for departments to model. The format of arrest reports is 
established by each police agency to suit its needs and may not include use 
of force information or relevant variables. Any narratives in the arrest report 
that might have provided details of force use are subject to redaction.  
• Police blotter/call sheets lack standardization among municipalities and 
provide only summaries of incidents that police agencies attended. 
Blotter/call sheets likely would have lacked sufficient detail of any force 
incident.  
94 
 
• Continuation and incident reports were likely to contain some, perhaps all, 
of the data needed for this study, but the value of each report is dependent 
upon a police officer’s ability to write a comprehensive narrative that 
includes a detailed description of the variables leading to the force outcome. 
However, despite their potential value, continuation and incident reports are 
not releasable under OPRA, and permission to gain access has regularly 
been denied by police agencies and court rulings.  
• Force incidents caught on video would have been useful for this study, but 
car-mounted video cameras were not common during the first half of this 
study period, and body-mounted cameras had not yet been considered a 
viable option. Also, reviewing numerous years of video recordings would 
have been impractical for only one researcher.  
• Finally, radio transmission recordings are releasable under OPRA but likely 
would neither capture all uses of force nor the details surrounding their use. 
Data collection was accomplished through the mechanisms established by New 
Jersey law. OPRA mandates that all New Jersey government records are subject to public 
access with limited exceptions (N.J. Stat. Ann. 47:1A-1 et seq.). Government records are 
those required by law to be made, maintained, or kept on file in the course of official 
business by any officer, commission, agency, or authority of New Jersey or its political 
subdivisions (N.J. Stat. Ann. 47:1A-1.1). All material needed for this study was 
categorized as government records under OPRA and relevant case law.  
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In addition to identifying publicly available government records, OPRA 
prescribes the procedure to request those records. While any of several methods of 
communication are permissible, I used the municipal copy of the OPRA request form to 
identify the records I wished to collect (see Appendix C for a generic model form). I 
requested the following records for the period between June 2000 and June 2010: (a) use 
of force policies, (b) RIP policies, (c) aggregate reporting made to the county prosecutor, 
and (d) use of force reports. I emailed those request forms directly to each municipal 
records custodian to ensure their delivery and to document its receipt via Mailtrack 
software. Where necessary, I drove to the municipal clerk to obtain paper copies of my 
requested documents but otherwise received those records in portable document format 
via email.  
Operationalization 
The original plan for this study was to examine all variables present on the use of 
force reporting form to examine their influence on force outcomes. These variables 
included (a) the RIP period, (b) officer sex, (c) officer race, (d) officer age, (e) officer 
tenure, (f) officer duty status, (g) officer wear of a uniform, (h) suspect sex, (i) suspect 
race, (j) suspect weapon, (k) suspect resistance, and (l) unusual circumstances. I also 
planned to use an interaction term, RIP period by suspect race. For various reasons 
described here and in Chapter 4, many of these variables were discarded. As a result, I 
was only able to use the following variables in my regression analysis, (a) the RIP period, 
(b) officer tenure, (c) suspect race, (d) suspect age, (e) suspect resistance, (f) suspect 
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unusual conditions, and (g) an interaction term, RIP period by suspect race. The 
operationalization of these variables is described in this section. 
Independent Variable 
The independent variable, a binary variable, was the RIP period indicating the 
promulgation of the NJOAG RIP directive. The directive was established as official 
policy for all New Jersey police agencies in June 2005. Therefore, the variable was either 
the first half of the studied timeframe (June 2000–June 2005) before the promulgation of 
the RIP directive or the second half (July 2005–June 2010) after the RIP directive was 
established (see Table 3 for coding). 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in this study was force, an ordinal variable representing 
the type of force used by officers. In this study, force was defined as lawful physical 
actions undertaken by police officers to protect persons or property or to overcome 
suspect resistance during the execution of their public duties that intentionally or 
unintentionally attempt or inflict physiological harm, impairment, or death (NJOAG, 
2000; N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:1-14(b); 2C:3-3 et seq.; 2C:3-7 et seq.; 2C:11-1 et seq.). In 
terms of the New Jersey policy, this definition excludes constructive authority and 
physical contact (e.g. verbal commands, pointing a firearm without firing, fingerprinting, 
and handcuffing). Neither prompt the reporting requirement, and therefore they were not 
reflected in the collected data. Further, this definition excludes illegal uses of force (e.g., 
excessive force), a distinction expressed in the policy.  
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Operationalization of force is represented by the options indicated on the New 
Jersey use of force reporting form. Force consists forceful actions divided into eight 
subcategories (a) compliance hold, (b) hands/fists, (c) kicks/feet, (d) chemical/natural 
agent, (e) strike/use baton or other object, (f) canine, (g) firearms discharge, and (h) 
other. Firearms discharges are further divided into intentional and accidental discharges. 
In this dissertation I examined policy rather than tactics, so I originally planned to 
collapse these subcategories into the those specified in the use of force policy, (a) 
physical force, (b) mechanical force, and (c) deadly force. However, the collected data 
did not produce a single incident of deadly force. Had there been a need to create a 
deadly force category, it would have included all firearms discharges. Therefore, the 
dependent variable was made dichotomous, physical force and mechanical force (see 
Table 1). If more than one level of force was used by an officer, the highest level of force 
was used in my analysis.  
These two categories are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. Physical 
force involves behaviors that do not qualify for inclusion in the mechanical force 
subcategory. Mechanical force involves behaviors that involve a device, canine, or 
substance, other than a firearm. Had instances of deadly force been collected, a third 
category of deadly force would have included all forms of force that posed a substantial 
risk of causing serious bodily injury or death. See Table 3 for coding. 
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Table 1 
Collapse of Force Tactics into Force Continuum Subcategories 
Physical force Mechanical force 
Compliance hold 
Hands/fists  
Kicks/feet 
Chemical/natural agent 
Strike/use baton or other object 
Conducted energy device 
Canine 
Note. The instrument permits officers to choose an additional subcategory of other. 
Where a response indicated other, I evaluated the response and entered it into one of 
these categories. All collected data points were considered lawful. 
 
Independent Variable of Interest 
I examined the influence of the RIP directive on officer uses of force upon people 
of different races. Therefore, the subject race variable was particularly important to this 
study. Race was operationalized as White and not-White (see Table 3 for coding) and 
made a binary variable because the RIP policy does not specify a particular race. Given 
that the issues of police trust center around events where Black men were killed by White 
police officers (Jones, 2015), the White race was used as the baseline for comparison to 
all others. I expected there would be an interaction between the RIP directive and race, so 
an interaction term was included in the statistical analyses.  
Confounding Variables 
In addition to the independent and dependent variables, and the independent 
variable of interest, other confounding variables were included based on previous force 
literature where each variable has shown mixed influence on force outcomes. They 
include suspect characteristics (age, unusual conditions, and resistance), and an officer 
characteristic (officer tenure). See Table 5 for coding. 
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Suspect age. Age was treated as a continuous variable (see Table 3).  
Suspect unusual conditions. Unusual condition is a categorical variable 
subcategorized on the use of force report into under the influence and other unusual 
condition. The answers provided by officers for other conditions was varied, lacked 
consistency, and often indicated multiple conditions. These answers made it difficult to 
create defined and exclusive subcategories. Therefore, I treated this variable as binary, 
either present or not (see Table 3). 
Suspect resistance. Resistance is an ordinal variable identified as suspect actions 
on the use of force reporting form. The New Jersey use of force policy does not define 
resistance, yet the extant literature has shown that resistance is a significant predictor of 
force (Bolger, 2014). The conceptualization of resistance is derived from state law, 
policy, and police training material. Resistance is defined as passive, active, and violent 
actions and threat of such actions, by subjects that are indicative of a refusal to comply 
with the lawful demands of officers (N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:29-1 et seq.; 2C:29-2 et seq.; 
NJOAG, 2000; New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice, 2000). Including threats is 
important because it represents an act of defiance on the part of the subject. The threat 
implies that any further actions taken by the officer in the execution of their public duties 
will be met with that level of resistance. The law does not require officers to desist in 
their duties when faced with threatened or actual resistance and allows officers to escalate 
force to compel the subject’s compliance (New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice, 
2000). Therefore, when the subject indicates either a threat of resistance or presents 
actual resistance, officers must accordingly respond to fulfill their duties. 
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Because this was a retrospective study, resistance is operationalized according to 
the choices indicated on the force reporting form. On the form, resistance is divided into 
eight subcategories, (a) resisted police officer control, (b) physical threat/attack on officer 
or another, (c) threatened/attacked officer or another with blunt object, (d) threatened/ 
attacked officer or another with knife/cutting object, (e) threatened/attacked officer or 
another with motor vehicle, (f) threatened officer or another with firearm, (g) fired at 
officer or another, and (h) other. These subcategories offer options to indicate that 
weapons were involved in the act of resistance, causing me to discard the use of a 
weapon variable due to independence of observations. These subcategories found on the 
form relate to specific tactics of resistance and can be collapsed in a manner similar to 
force. The collected data did not provide a sufficient number of observations for 
resistance involving more than personal weapons (e.g., hands and fists), causing me to 
collapse these eight subcategories into two. They were collapsed into passive and active 
resistance (See Table 3). If the suspect used more than one level of resistance, the highest 
level of resistance posed by the suspect was used in my analysis. Coding is provided in 
Table 3.  
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Table 2 
Collapse of Suspect Actions Subcategories into the Resistance Continuum 
Passive resistance Active resistance 
Resisted police 
officer control  
Physical threat/attack on officer or another 
Threatened/attacked officer or another with blunt object 
Threatened/attacked officer or another with knife/cutting 
object 
Threatened/attacked officer or another with motor vehicle 
Threatened officer or another with firearm 
Fired at officer or another 
Note. The instrument permits officers to choose an additional subcategory of other. 
Actions detailed in this category were evaluated for inclusion into these categories. 
 
Officer tenure. This variable indicates the number of years the officer has served 
as a police officer. It was treated as continuous variable.  
Table 3 
Summary and Coding of Variables 
Variable Name Variable Coding 
RIP period (IV) 0 = Not promulgated, 1 = Promulgated 
Force (DV) 0 = Physical force, 1 = Mechanical force 
Suspect race (IV of interest) 0 = White, 1 = Not White 
Suspect age Continuous 
Suspect unusual conditions 0 = Not present, 1 = Present 
Suspect resistance 0 = Passive, 1 = Active  
Office tenure Continuous 
 
Data Analysis Plan 
The collected data was scrubbed and entered into an Excel spreadsheet. Three 
hundred and one use of force reports were drawn to fulfill the required sample. Where a 
use of force report was found to be incomplete in any variable except officer tenure, it 
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was replaced with a complete report from the same year and municipality. In 10 instances 
a report was replaced with a randomly chosen report from a neighboring town during the 
same year because there were no additional reports from that municipality to choose. The 
data from the study sample were entered into an Excel spreadsheet for ultimate analysis 
with IBM SPSS Statistics, version 21. I addressed the following research question and 
hypotheses in this study: 
RQ1: How did the New Jersey RIP directive affect municipal police officer uses 
of force on non-Whites after its implementation in one New Jersey county? 
Ho1: The New Jersey RIP directive did not significantly affect municipal police 
officer uses of force on non-Whites after its implementation in one New Jersey county. 
Ha1: The New Jersey RIP directive did significantly affect municipal police 
officer uses of force on non-Whites after its implementation in one New Jersey county. 
I used binomial logistic regression to analyze the data and chose to reject the null 
hypothesis at the 0.05 level of significance, when the odds ratio shows a difference in 
force used between Whites and non-Whites, indicating the RIP directive did significantly 
affect municipal police officer uses of force on non-Whites after its implementation in 
one New Jersey county. 
Threats to Validity 
Validity is crucial in all research. It represents the best approximation of the truth 
in what is being studied. The findings of research may be diminished due to external, 
internal, construct, and statistical conclusion validity. This section addresses how those 
threats affected this study and how those threats were reduced. 
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Threats to external validity may prevent generalizing the findings of research to 
populations, but such threats to this study were minimal. The two main threats to external 
validity are representativeness of the sample and reactive arrangements (Frankfort-
Nachmias et al., 2015). Ondercin (2004) divided reactive arrangements into artificial 
laboratory environments and testing effects. In this study, I used a probability design 
incorporating a proportional stratified random sample across various years and 
municipalities for a known population to improve the representativeness of the sample. 
The historical data used reflects incidents as they occurred during actual police-civilian 
encounters and was not affected by a laboratory environment. Finally, it is unlikely that 
officers were given a pretest that biased their actions against subjects. The degree of the 
external validity threat to this study was minimal and allow for generalization to the 
population (use of force incidents within the studied county). 
Threats to internal validity reduce confidence in the findings and limit the ability 
of the researcher to rule out rival explanations for associations between the independent 
and dependent variables, but these threats were significant in this study. Campbell and 
Stanley (1963) and Frankfort-Nachmias et al. (2015) explained that history, maturation, 
testing, instrumentation, statistical regression, biased selection, experimental mortality, 
selection-maturation, and selection-interaction affect internal validity. Many of these 
extraneous variables affect experimental research, which this research was not. History, 
testing, statistical regression, experimental mortality, selection-maturation, and selection-
interaction, which are influential in experimental studies, are not influential in this 
retrospective non-experiment. Still, the other factors were relevant. I avoided biased 
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selection through random selection methods for inclusion in the sample. Instrumentation 
posed little threat because the variables collected and used in this study were consistent 
throughout the reports used in the analysis. However, officers matured during their tenure 
in policing, which may have altered their usage of force. Overall, threats to internal 
validity were minimal. 
Finally, threats to construct and statistical conclusion validity posed little threat to 
this research. Construct validity is threatened when test measures do not accurately 
measure their intended construct (Frankfort-Nachmias et al., 2015). The use of force 
reporting form was designed in conjunction with New Jersey law and the use of force 
policy to accurately measure force and, therefore, has construct validity. Conclusion 
validity is threatened when data sets are insufficient. I determined an appropriate sample 
size using reliable means. Therefore, the conclusions reached through the chosen 
statistical methods were valid. 
Ethical Procedures 
All necessary steps were taken to ensure this research conformed to the ethical 
requirements of Walden University. I gathered data previously and lawfully collected by 
others and that are now part of the New Jersey public record. Research involving publicly 
available records and archival or secondary data poses little risk to human subjects. 
Walden University requires that the Institutional Review Board (IRB) review studies 
using data collected by others. All data collection was done in accordance with Walden 
IRB approval (#02-14-17-0505878). 
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The publicly available data that I collected included information that identified 
the subjects, officers, departments, and county involved in each forceful incident. 
Reporting this information does not violate confidentiality because state law requires 
such information to be made available for public release within 24-hours of the citizen’s 
arrest (N.J. Stat. Ann. 47:1A-3[b]; 47:1A-10.). Many of the incidents that I gathered for 
this study, as well as the identities of those involved in the incident, were reported in the 
press. Still, I chose to keep this information confidential in this study. 
Despite the lawfulness of identifying suspects, officers, and departments involved 
in this study, I was concerned about the safety, security, and well-being of all involved. 
Allowing past criminal activity to resurface may cause undue harm for some (Bender & 
Crowley, 2015). Identifying the involvement of officers and organizations in uses of 
force in the current environment, particularly when examining force use along racial 
lines, has the potential to increase physical and economic harm posed to officers, and 
social and economic harm to communities (Chang, 2015; Fernandez, Perez-Pena, & 
Bromwich, 2016; Jansen, 2016; Yuhas & Laughland, 2016). Therefore, identifying 
information of the suspects, officers, and county are not reported in this dissertation. 
Paper documents supplying data for this study were physically protected from 
loss and unintended disclosure. When not in use, the paper documents were kept a fire-
resistant safe secured with a key and combination. They will remain secured in the key 
and combination safe for 5 years after the publication of this dissertation, at which time 
they will be securely destroyed. 
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Portable digital format files involved in this study were electronically protected to 
prevent loss and unintended disclosure. When not in use, these files were kept in a 
password-protected encrypted folder. They will remain secured in the password-protected 
encrypted folder for 5-years after the publication of this dissertation, at which time they 
will be securely destroyed. 
The data for this study were protected from direct and indirect unintentional 
disclosure. Only my dissertation committee and I had direct access to protected data. All 
demographic details and site descriptions below the state-level were withheld to prevent 
releasing the location of the study. 
This research presents implications for social change by contributing context and 
empirical evidence to the discussion of the public’s trust in the police by examining the 
force phenomena and its relationship to the public policy that guarantees equal protection 
to all people. It illustrates how previous research has treated the phenomenon and how 
future research could better aid civilians, police leaders, and policymakers in advancing 
evidence-based public policy. My research also serves as an example to civilians by 
showing how they can collect records under the authority of open public records laws and 
thoughtfully examine the data to prevail over diminished government transparency where 
these data are not regularly published in the public domain. The findings were made 
available to all of those required to complete my degree as identified by Walden 
University and are now available to civilians, community organizations, participating 
agencies, government officials, and the NJOAG, as appropriate. 
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Summary 
In Chapter 3, I explained that this study examined the influence of the New Jersey 
RIP directive on police uses of force to determine if it prevents officers from using race 
as a factor in their decisions. I used a nonexperimental retrospective quantitative design 
and a proportional stratified random sample for that purpose. The independent variable 
was the existence of the RIP directive. The dependent variable was the highest level of 
force used by the officer. The independent variable of interest was the race of the subject. 
Other variables previously shown to influence force outcomes were controlled during my 
analysis. Data were collected from publicly available government records, specifically, 
the New Jersey use of force reporting form. In Chapter 4, I will provide the details of my 
collected data and the finding of my analysis. 
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Chapter 4: Results 
Introduction 
The purpose of this retrospective quantitative nonexperimental study was to 
examine the influence of the New Jersey RIP directive on officers’ use of force. I sought 
to answer the following research question: How did the New Jersey RIP directive affect 
municipal police officer uses of force on non-Whites after its implementation in one New 
Jersey county? My null hypothesis was that the New Jersey RIP directive did not 
significantly affect municipal police officer uses of force on non-Whites after its 
implementation in one New Jersey county. My alternate hypothesis was that the New 
Jersey RIP directive did significantly affect municipal police officer uses of force on non-
Whites after its implementation in one New Jersey county. 
To answer the question, I collected the following publicly available records from 
municipal police agencies in one New Jersey county: use of force and RIP policies, 
aggregate reporting made by municipal police agencies to their county prosecutor, and 
use of force reports. I encountered multiple difficulties in collecting the data and 
discovered loopholes in the OPRA law that serve to subvert governmental transparency 
Nevertheless, once the data were received, they were coded and analyzed using binomial 
logistic regression in SPSS. The findings failed to generate the significance level needed 
to reject the null hypothesis. However, the results also indicated that the race of the 
suspect was not a significant factor in force outcomes for this sample. In this chapter, I 
will further discuss my data collection experience and the results of my study. 
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Data Collection 
As required by law, I submitted OPRA request forms to the municipal clerks at 
each municipality to gather use of force policies, RIP policies, aggregate reporting made 
to the county prosecutor, and use of force reports. The requested records consisted of 
those effective during or created between July 2000 and June 2010. These OPRA 
requests were transmitted to each municipal clerk by email on February 14, 2017, and 
tracked using MailTrack software. 
The OPRA law indicated that I might receive all reasonably available records 
within 7 days and that I might be required to pay special fees. Still, I anticipated that 
many of my requested documents would have been placed in archives, so I established a 
reasonable data collection period and a ceiling for special assessment charges. Under 
OPRA, municipal clerks are required to provide responses to government record requests 
within 7 business days and expeditiously deliver records that are currently available and 
not in storage (N.J. Stat. Ann. 47:1A-5[i]). Where the municipal clerks are unable do so, 
they must contact the requestor with an anticipated delivery date to ask for an extension 
(N.J. Stat. Ann. 47:1A-5[i]). Where the production of these records requires extraordinary 
expenditure of time and equipment, the clerks may assess a special service charge (N.J. 
Stat. Ann. 47:1A-5[c]). Based on the initial responses I received from the clerks and their 
requests for additional time to fulfill my requests, I assigned March 26, 2017 as the end 
date for my data collection period. Most clerks expressed that special assessment charges 
would be nominal while others were unsure but suggested it might be costly. Therefore, I 
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established a threshold of $250 as the amount I would pay for all special service charges 
combined. The result of my effort was mixed. 
On March 27, 2017, I received the last set of requested documents used in this 
study. My data collection period ended on March 31, 2017 and while I remained open to 
the possibility of receiving more records after that date, I did not receive any. The time 
needed to provide an initial response to my request and then to provide a complete set of 
available records widely differed among the municipalities. The range of time before 
receiving initial responses from the clerks ranged from 0 to 11 business days (M = 5 days, 
SD = 3), not including the day of my request. Of the eight municipal clerks who provided 
records, the time needed to provide the complete set of requested records ranged from 7 
to 28 business days (M = 16, SD = 7). This range excludes one business day where all 
municipal offices were closed for a major winter storm. I paid $19.20 in total service 
charges for these records. 
On April 1, 2017, I began to evaluate my data. I examined the provided policies 
for conformity with NJOAG guidelines and reviewed the aggregate reporting made to the 
county prosecutor. I also constructed an Excel spreadsheet to account for every collected 
force reporting form from the agencies that met my assumptions and used it to establish 
the sampling frame for the two 5-year periods of my study.  
My data collection effort was met with several discrepancies relative to my plan. 
Overall, by the end of my collection period, I received records from eight municipal 
clerks who I contacted, largely representing communities from the middle and higher 
portions of the county’s socioeconomic scale but with lower levels interspersed within 
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them. The remaining four clerks recited explanations that included complete record 
destruction due to a recent natural disaster, lost or misplaced records, and that a 
substantial or indeterminate amount of time was needed to gather them. For those 
municipal clerks who did not claim the data were irretrievable, all implied various 
degrees of willingness to cooperate, but none fulfilled my request by the end of the 
collection period or by June 9, 2017. 
The first part of my OPRA request sought police agency use of force policies so 
that I could compare them to NJOAG (2000). I received use of force policies from all the 
clerks who provided records in response to my request. Of the policies, six were in effect 
during all or most of my study period. The other clerks provided the most current version 
of the use of force policy dated after my study period, stating that they did not retain 
older versions. This violated my assumption that all agencies would retain copies of the 
policies that were in effect at that time. Still, none of these municipal police agencies 
were certified by the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies or the 
New Jersey State Association of Chiefs of Police, which would have required more 
stringent standards than those mandated by the NJOAG. As a result, their current policies 
do not substantially differ from requirements of the NJOAG. Therefore, because the 
current policies do not differ from that which was mandated, I continued to assume that 
the policies in effect during my study period also conformed with the NJOAG 
requirements. 
The second part of my OPRA request sought police agency RIP policies so that I 
could compare them to NJOAG (2005). The clerks produced the most current version of 
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the RIP policy. Four of these policies showed revision histories indicating promulgation 
dates years earlier than the 2005 NJOAG mandate (M = 3.5, SD = 0.86). It is an 
exceptional finding that the leadership of these departments voluntarily chose to provide 
civilians with added protections above the state’s minimum threshold. This finding 
resulted in these departments being excluded from my research because of the impact 
they would have on the reliability and validity of this study. For the other four policies, 
the only date listed shown was when the current version of the policy was approved, and 
none included a policy revision history. Again, none of the municipalities were certified 
by the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies or the New Jersey 
State Association of Chiefs of Police, which would have required more stringent 
standards than those mandated by the NJOAG. The current policies are nearly mirror 
images of the state model. Therefore, I continued to assume that the policies in effect 
during my study period also conformed with the NJOAG requirements. 
The third part of my OPRA request sought each police agency’s aggregate 
reporting of force to the county prosecutor so that I could compare the number of force 
reports I received to the official data provided to the prosecutor. The responding 
municipal clerks provided a poor response to this request. Of the responses provided by 
municipal clerks, only three contained these records. Clerks explained that their police 
agencies (a) send copies of the use of force reports in lieu of an aggregate report, (b) lost 
or misplaced these records, or (c) are not required to keep copies of these reports once 
they are sent to the prosecutor. It is interesting that of the provided aggregate reports, 
only 30% of the reported years reflected the frequency of force indicated by officers on 
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their force reporting forms; 45% of the documented years were overreported (M = 5.56, 
SD = 3.98), and 25% were underreported (M = -3.25, SD = 1.92). In light of the dearth of 
county prosecutor aggregate reports and the inaccuracies of those provided, these reports 
were not helpful in fulfilling their planned role to confirm the sampling frame.  
The final part of my OPRA request sought all individual officer use of force 
reporting forms submitted to their agencies so that I could conduct data collection on my 
intended variables. The municipal clerks who responded to my OPRA request supplied 
1,274 use of force reporting forms representing incidents from 54.17% of the department-
years I hoped to use in this study. With the removal of the agencies that promulgated a 
RIP policy prior to the NJOAG, I was left with 499 use of force reporting forms from 
four agencies representing 31.67% of the total department-years I hoped to use in this 
study. The collected forms were a mixture of the NJOAG (2000) model report, an older 
version of the model NJOAG report, and one agency-created version that did not conform 
to the NJOAG model. In many years, officers were permitted to report their force usage 
on more than one version of the form. In 10 instances, nonconforming force reports were 
randomly selected for inclusion in my sample. These reports were replaced by others 
from within the department during that year or from neighboring agencies during that 
year which were not otherwise entered into the sample. 
Collecting my requested documents was fraught with added complication. These 
complications highlight the difference between how the law is written and how it is 
actually applied by municipal clerks. First, some of the municipal clerks told me that they 
needed to route my request through the county prosecutor for approval. However, all 
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municipal clerks in New Jersey were notified by the NJOAG in 2006 that routing 
requests through the county prosecutor was improper and that the clerks alone are 
responsible for making decisions concerning OPRA requests (H. Goldberg, personal 
communication. September 30, 2011). Second, certain clerks unlawfully redacted 
documents requiring me to recite statute and case law before they finally delivered 
unredacted or lawfully redacted reports. In another similar case, the municipal attorney 
redacted the department’s use of force policy, citing the security exception to OPRA. 
This was an odd response to my request because the unredacted portions were an exact 
copy of the NJOAG model policy (see Appendix B) and the redacted words were easily 
discovered. Third, one municipality denied my request citing that it amounted to a 
request for the clerk to conduct research, which was prohibited by OPRA. This was an 
incorrect and unlawful response, but I was unable to resolve the problem in time to 
conduct data analysis despite the involvement of an attorney specializing in OPRA. A 
fourth complication involved apparent deceptiveness where an agency effectively denied 
having its own use of force policy by sending an exact copy of the NJOAG policy, 
completed with a filename of “use of force AG Directive.” This agency also denied the 
existence of a RIP policy. A conversation with the clerk revealed that the police 
department will not disclose the existence of either policy, citing the security exception 
under OPRA. This matter also required the involvement of an OPRA attorney. The lesson 
to be learned from this experience is that requestors of public documents must be fully 
aware of the OPRA law, its nuances, and previous court decisions, and must be prepared 
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to respond with the vehemence allowed by law to ensure that the clerks provide an 
appropriate response to their requests. 
My final discovery about the operation of the OPRA law directly relates to the 
special assessment fee and the missing 46.97% of the years of use of force data I 
expected to receive. Large special assessment fees can become an effective denial of a 
request. Only three of my requests were met with complete data responses involving all 
department-years requested. In most cases, the clerks advised me that they would need to 
examine archived records or review every police incident file for each year where the 
records were not readily available to see if the files contained a use of force report. 
Special assessment fees ranged between $35 to $55 per hour. I was quoted over $500 by 
one clerk, and a fee in excess of $300 by another. Because of the cost of these fees, I 
instructed the clerks to end their data collection. 
Study Results 
From the population of 449 force reports, a combined stratified proportionate 
random sample of 301 force reporting forms was determined with the use of the Raosoft 
(2004) sample-size calculator, a 0.05 significance level, and a 95% confidence level. The 
sample consisted of stratums representing 12-month periods and municipal police 
agencies. The sample size required for the first five-year period (July 2000 – June 2005) 
was 123 documented incidents, representing 90% of the department-years in that period 
for those agencies. The average number of force incidents for all departments combined 
in each year of the first period was 34 (SD = 20.24). The second 5-year period (July 
2005–June 2010) required a sample of 178 documented force incidents, representing 
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100% of the department-years in that period for those agencies. The average number of 
force incidents for all departments combined in each year of the second period was 65.80 
(SD = 9.54).  
The sample was drawn and data were entered on the Excel spreadsheet. Unique 
labels were created for each of the seven variables used in this study. These variables 
have been used in past scholarly research of police uses of force and have been found to 
influence force outcomes. Variable data from each report was entered in the appropriate 
column exactly as it appeared on the form. Where the officers’ years of service were 
missing, I consulted with the Asbury Park Press’s Data Universe to gather publicly 
available information from the New Jersey Division of Pension and Benefits, Police and 
Fireman’s Retirement System to calculate those degrees of tenure. These data were then 
coded as planned (see Table 5) and uploaded to SPSS, version 21 for analysis. The 
descriptive characteristics of the variables used in this study are presented in Table 6. My 
data use and research design conformed to Walden IRB approval #02-14-17-0505878. 
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Table 4 
Summary of Descriptive Statistics of the Study Sample (N = 301) 
 
Variables Pre-RIP (n = 123) Post-RIP (n = 178) 
Officer force   
Physical 98 147 
Mechanical 25 31 
Officer years of tenure   
Observations 93 170 
Mean [range] 7.39 [0 – 29] 8.18 [0 – 27] 
Stand. Dev. 6.16 6.13 
Suspect race   
White 61 104 
Not-White 62 74 
Suspect age   
Observations 123 178 
Mean [range] 31.87 [12 – 62] 33.42 [15 – 70] 
Stand. Dev. 13.49 12.93 
Suspect resistance   
Passive 76 110 
Active 47 68 
Unusual conditions   
Not present 78 80 
Present 45 98 
 
I used binomial logistic regression to conduct my data analysis. Binomial logistic 
regression attempts to predict the probability of categorical outcomes given certain 
independent variables but requires the satisfaction of several assumptions. Laerd 
Statistics (2015) explained that the assumptions begin with a dependent variable that is 
ordinal, and independent variables that are continuous, ordinal, or categorical. All 
variables must have independence of observations, be mutually exclusive and collectively 
exhaustive, and must have at least 15 observations (Laerd Statistics, 2015). Additionally, 
there must be a linear relationship between the continuous variables and the logit 
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transformation of the dependent variable, no multicollinearity, and no significant outliers 
(Laerd Statistics, 2015). 
The statistical assumptions concerning my variables were satisfied in the 
following ways prior to analysis. As indicated in Table 6, the dependent variable, officer 
force, is ordinal and dichotomous. It is ordinal because in the NJOAG (2000) policy 
physical force is considered a lesser severity than mechanical force. The independent 
variables, suspect race and unusual conditions, are categorical, and their possible values 
are not ordered (see Table 6). Suspect resistance is ordinal, as passive resistance requires 
no threat to the officer while active resistance indicates an increase in threatening 
behavior or an attack upon the officer. Suspect resistance is treated as a continuous 
variable in this regression. Officer years of tenure and suspect age are continuous (see 
Table 6). All variables possess independence of observations as none are not affected by 
common influences. Variables are related in such a way that observation in one precludes 
observation in any other variable or category. All variable categories cover the entire 
realm of possibilities and are therefore collectively exhaustive.  
The number of observations within the originally planned variables for this study 
presented a challenge to some factors but was overcome by discarding certain variables 
and collapsing the subcategories of the suspect resistance variable. I originally had hoped 
to include the variables (a) officer sex, (b) officer race, (c) officer duty status, and (d) 
suspect sex. Unfortunately, there were fewer than 15 female observations in either sex 
variable and too few observations of non-White officers and off-duty officers. These 
variables were necessarily discarded from my analysis. Also, the suspect resistance 
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variable did not allow me to include more levels of resistance. The more severe forms of 
suspect resistance, mechanical resistance (use of a device or substance that was not a 
firearm) and deadly resistance (use of a firearm or other device or substance that posed a 
substantial risk of death or which caused serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted 
loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ), had fewer than 15 
observations in either period. I combined them with physical resistance to create the 
subcategory called active resistance. This resulted in the suspect resistance category 
becoming binary. Once this process was completed, I determine that all variables 
contained 15 or more observations (see Table 6). 
Prior to conducting the final regression, I performed analysis of my variables for 
linearity to the logit transformation of the dependent variable. To test for linearity, I 
conducted a binomial logistic regression using the Box-Tidwell (1962) procedure. This 
procedure required that I create natural log transformations of the continuous variables 
and interaction terms with their respective variable (e.g., natural log of officer tenure by 
officer tenure). All were all entered into the binomial regression. Tabachnick and Fidell 
(2007) recommended that a Bonferonni correction be applied to account for multiple 
comparisons of all the terms in the regression, including the intercept, before interpreting 
the results. This required me to divide the commonly accepted significance level of .05 
by the 10 terms in my regression. As a result, I accepted significance at .005 and I 
discovered that the officer tenure variable violated the assumption (p = .003). I created a 
histogram of the variable and found it was positively skewed. Therefore, I transformed 
the variable to its square root and repeated the regression. Once again, significance was 
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accepted at .005. The results of the second regression indicated that all continuous 
independent variables were linearly related to the logit transformation of the dependent 
variable. 
Finally, before conducting the final regression, I examined my data for highly 
correlated variables (multicollinearity). I performed a bivariate correlation using the 
Spearman coefficient to detect monotonic relationships. I found that the transformed 
officer tenure variable correlated above .8 with officer age. I then performed a multiple 
regression to examine more closely for multicollinearity by obtaining standard errors, 
tolerances, and variance inflation factors (VIF). I found that the highest VIF values were 
the transformed officer tenure and officer age, at 2.89 and 2.92, respectively. While these 
values showed moderate correlation, I decided these variables warranted additional 
attention, as younger officers will typically have fewer years of service. Since I obtained 
more data on officer tenure than officer age, I elected to discard the officer age variable 
from further analysis. I then conducted another test for linearity and multicollinearity. All 
continuous variables were found to be linearly related to the logit transformation of the 
dependent variable (officer force). No variables showed significant correlation with each 
other and none shared a large portion of their variance with other variables (see Table 7). 
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Table 5 
Test for Multicollinearity 
 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) .108 .101 
 
1.075 .283 
  
RIP period -.031 .049 -.037 -.628 .530 .975 1.025 
Transformed officer tenure .054 .021 .155 2.639 .009 .984 1.016 
Suspect race .081 .049 .101 1.636 .103 .890 1.124 
Suspect age -.004 .002 -.132 -2.165 .031 .913 1.096 
Suspect resistance .193 .048 .239 4.049 .000 .973 1.028 
Unusual conditions -.028 .048 -.036 -.591 .555 .927 1.079 
a. Dependent variable: Officer force 
 
My final test of assumptions involved the detection of outliers, leverage, or 
influential points during the final regression analysis. The analysis indicated 14 
studentized residuals with values of 2.5 or greater standard deviations existed in the data. 
Upon closer examination, I discovered that these cases involved officers use of 
mechanical force in response to low levels of resistance. These force responses are 
permitted by law and policy, so I elected to keep these cases in my analysis. 
I performed the binomial logistic regression to ascertain how the New Jersey RIP 
directive affected municipal police officer uses of force on non-Whites after its 
implementation in one New Jersey county. My logistic regression model was statistically 
significant, χ2 (7) = 38.484, p < .05.  The model had a good fit based on Hosmer and 
Lemeshow, p = .195. The model explained 21.6% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in 
force use and correctly classified 81.4% of cases. Sensitivity was 15.4%, specificity was 
97.6%, positive predictive value was 61.54%, and negative predictive value was 82.4%. 
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Of the seven independent variables, three were statistically significant: officer tenure, 
suspect age, and suspect resistance (see Table 8). Increases associated with officer tenure 
were associated with an increased likelihood of using mechanical force. Increases 
associated with suspect age were associated with a decreased likelihood of mechanical 
force. Finally, increased suspect resistance was associated with increased use of 
mechanical force by the officers. Neither the interaction term (RIP period by suspect 
race) nor suspect race were significant. Based on these findings, I could not reject the null 
hypothesis which states that the New Jersey RIP directive had no significant effect on 
municipal police officer uses of force on non-Whites after its implementation in one New 
Jersey county. 
Table 6 
 
Binomial Logistic Regression Analysis (n = 301) 
 
Variable B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 95% C.I for EXP(B) 
       Lower Upper 
RIP period -.705 .505 1.949 1 .163 .494 .184 1.329 
Officer tenure .353 .150 5.578 1 .018 1.424 1.062 1.909 
Suspect race .048 .562 .007 1 .931 1.050 .349 3.155 
Suspect age -.036 .015 5.416 1 .020 .965 .936 .994 
Suspect resistance 1.282 .346 13.735 1 .000 3.605 1.830 7.102 
Unusual conditions -.056 .361 .024 1 .878 .946 .466 1.921 
Interaction RIP period 
by Suspect race 
.892 .699 1.627 1 .202 2.439 .620 9.602 
       
Model χ2 = 38.484  p < .05 
Hosmer and Lemeshow = .195 
Nagelkerke R2  = .216 
Note. All variables were calculated during simultaneous analysis. 
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Despite my inability to reject the null hypothesis, the findings are still an 
important indicator of the value of the RIP directive. The results indicated that race was 
not a factor in force outcomes over this 10-year period. I chose to explore this significant 
finding more closely. I examined each period individually to establish if race had been a 
factor in force outcomes either before or after the promulgation of the RIP directive. The 
RIP period variable and interaction term were removed from the model. Although the 
samples were small, I found that race was not a significant factor in force outcomes 
during either period. 
The logistic regression model for the pre-RIP period was statistically significant, 
χ2 (5) = 17.90, p < .05. The model had a good fit based on Hosmer and Lemeshow, p = 
.337. The model explained 26.7% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in force use and 
correctly classified 78.5% of cases. Sensitivity was 28.6%, specificity was 93.1%, 
positive predictive value was 54.54% and negative predictive value was 81.70%. The 
analysis indicated two studentized residuals with values of 2.5 or greater standard 
deviations existed in the data that involved cases where officers used of mechanical force 
in response to low levels of resistance. This force response is permitted by law and 
policy, so these cases were kept in the model. Of the variables, only one was significant, 
suspect resistance, for which increasing resistance was associated with a greater 
likelihood of mechanical force (see Table 9). Therefore, race was not a significant factor 
in force outcomes during this period. This finding gives the appearance that the RIP 
directive was unnecessary from a practical standpoint for this sample. Although, given 
the 1999 consent decree between the NJSP and the USAG which settled a 42 USC § 
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14141 lawsuit, the promulgation of the RIP directive to all police agencies in the state 
was, if nothing else, a political necessity. 
The logistic regression model for the post-RIP period was statistically significant, 
χ2 (5) = 22.33, p < .05. The model had a good fit based on Hosmer and Lemeshow, p = 
.062. The model explained 20.1% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in force use and 
correctly classified 82.4% of cases. Sensitivity was 16.1%, specificity was 97.1%, 
positive predictive value was 55.56% and negative predictive value was 83.85%. The 
analysis indicated 11 studentized residuals with values of 2.5 or greater standard 
deviations existed in the data that involved cases where officers used of mechanical force 
in response to low levels of resistance. Again, that force response is permitted by law and 
policy, so these cases were kept in the model. Three variables were found to be 
significant, officer tenure, suspect age, and suspect resistance (see Table 10). Increases 
associated with officer tenure were associated with an increased likelihood of using 
mechanical force. Increases associated with suspect age were associated with a decreased 
likelihood of mechanical force. Suspect resistance was associated with increased use of 
mechanical force by the officers. Once again, race was not a significant factor in force 
outcomes. 
 
  
125 
 
Table 7 
 
Pre-RIP Period Binomial Logistic Regression Analysis (n = 123) 
 
Variable B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 95% C.I for EXP(B) 
       Lower Upper 
Officer tenure .321 .245 1.720 1 .190 1.378 .853 2.226 
Suspect race .154 .616 .062 1 .803 1.116 .349 3.899 
Suspect age -.051 .026 3.727 1 .054 .951 .903 1.001 
Suspect resistance 1.707 .598 8.150 1 .004 5.512 1.707 17.794 
Unusual conditions .463 .322 .553 1 .457 1.588 .469 5.378 
       
  
Model χ2 = 17.940, p < .05 
Hosmer and Lemeshow = .337  
Nagelkerke R2  =.267 
Note. All variables were calculated during simultaneous analysis. 
 
Table 8 
 
Post-RIP Period Binomial Logistic Regression Analysis (n = 178) 
 
Variable B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 95% C.I for EXP(B) 
       Lower Upper 
Officer tenure .409 .194 4.454 1 .035 1.506 1.030 2.203 
Suspect race .864 .451 3.661 1 .056 2.372 .979 5.746 
Suspect age -.029 .019 2.289 1 .130 .971 .936 1.009 
Suspect resistance 1.004 .431 5.412 1 .020 2.728 1.171 6.355 
Unusual conditions -.379 .448 .715 1 .398 .685 .285 1.647 
       
  
Model χ2 = 22.333, p < .05 
Hosmer and Lemeshow = .062 
Nagelkerke R2 = .201 
Note. All variables were calculated during simultaneous analysis. 
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Summary 
In this chapter, I described my data collection and analysis processes. I further 
reported the difficulties that I encountered in collecting publicly available information 
from the municipal agencies that I intended to study. I designed this retrospective 
quantitative nonexperimental study to examine the influence of the New Jersey RIP 
directive on officer uses of force in one New Jersey county to determine if the policy 
altered force outcomes for non-Whites after its implementation in June 2005. My 
inferential analysis revealed that only officer tenure, suspect age, and suspect resistance 
significantly influenced officer uses of mechanical force between July 2000 and June 
2010. Therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. The New Jersey RIP directive had 
no effect on officer uses of force on non-Whites after its implementation in the studied 
county. Further analysis revealed that the race of the suspect was not a significant factor 
in force outcomes in either period. In Chapter 5, I will provide an interpretation of my 
findings and discuss their implication on public policy and social change. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
Introduction 
The purpose of this retrospective quantitative nonexperimental study was to 
examine the influence of the New Jersey RIP directive on officer uses of force to 
determine if the promulgation of the policy in 2005 altered force outcomes for non-
Whites in one New Jersey county. If the administrative rule was effective at preventing 
RIP, then the application of force should not have disproportionately impacted any racial 
category after the RIP directive was implemented. Using publicly available police agency 
records, I conducted a binomial logistic regression on data from a stratified random 
sample consisting of the 5-year period before and after the promulgation of the New 
Jersey RIP directive. An interaction term was used for the RIP period by race to account 
for the influence of the directive on suspect race. My results show that the RIP directive 
did not significantly affect force outcomes for non-Whites. In this chapter, I will provide 
an interpretation of my findings, discuss issues related to the limitations of this study, 
offer recommendations for further research, and discuss the implications these findings 
may have for social change. 
Interpretation of the Findings 
As described in Chapter 3, the state of research into police uses of force is marred 
with problems concerning the conceptualization and operationalization of force. I am 
cautious in drawing comparisons to those studies because few researchers have 
approached the topic with the conceptualization or operationalization used here. Despite 
the differences between my study and the existing literature, my findings support 
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previous discoveries regarding the degree of force used by officers. My findings indicate 
that 81% of the force used by officers was of the lowest level of force possible (physical 
force). Garner et al. (2002), Lawton (2007), and Terrill and Mastrofski (2002) also found 
that officers more commonly apply lower levels of force. While conceptualizations and 
operationalizations differ among those studies and mine, all have shown that officers tend 
toward lower levels of force. 
 Instead of attempting to draw other comparisons to dissimilar studies, I will 
compare the results discovered in this study with the results from a meta-analysis of force 
studies by Bolger (2014) who sought to identify key correlates of police decisions to use 
force. The intent of that study was to permit other researchers to overcome some of the 
difficulty in comparing prior research by allowing them to directly compare their findings 
to the findings in his meta-analytic review (Bolger, 2014). 
Bolger (2014) admitted significant methodological limitations in the analysis but 
established that variables tapping into encounter and suspect characteristics show the 
greatest impact on the likelihood of force being used. Variables in Bolger’s study that 
have consistently shown an increase in the likelihood of force include evidence of 
criminal behavior, weapon possession, suspect resistance, and arrest. The race of the 
suspect was also found to be significant despite the prior research finding mixed results.  
Unfortunately, the nature of my retrospective research using government records 
prevents me from drawing comparisons to Bolger’s results for criminal behavior, weapon 
possession, and arrest. The data I collected indicated a great amount of uncertainty 
surrounding these variables because of missing contextual data, errors and omissions in 
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the officer answers, or insufficient frequencies. For example, while criminal charges were 
often listed, they generally took the form of statute titles or incomplete statutes numbers. 
Because many statutes provide for a range of similar offenses and offense levels, it 
became impossible in many cases to determine the exact criminal behavior for which the 
suspect was charged. This issue complicated the interpretation of weapon possession. The 
charges gave rise to ambiguity regarding officer awareness of the weapon prior to using 
force and made useless any possibility of using an assumption of foreknowledge. Also, 
there were insufficient instances where arrests were not made to draw valid conclusions. 
Nonetheless, I could compare my findings to two variables correlating significantly to 
force outcomes presented by Bolger. 
Bolger (2014) determined that resistance increases the likelihood of force use. My 
finding extends that conclusion. While my study did not examine resistance relative to 
compliance, it did examine passive resistance as well as active resistance to determine the 
likelihood of mechanical force usage. Active resistance included threats and use of 
physical, mechanical, and deadly resistance. I found that active resistance increased the 
likelihood that an officer would respond with mechanical force. 
Bolger (2014) also determined that the race of the suspect was a significant factor 
in force outcomes. In particular, minorities were more likely to have force used against 
them. My findings disconfirm that hypothesis. I found that the race of the suspect was not 
a significant factor in force outcomes over the 10-year period of my study and in either of 
the two 5-years periods examined.  
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In addition to the concrete findings of the meta-analysis, Bolger (2014) also 
correctly criticized the available research into intoxication and force outcomes because 
they failed to draw distinctions between alcohol and drugs. This was an issue present in 
my unusual condition variable. While many reports did provide some indication of the 
type of alleged suspect intoxication, many others were simply described as under the 
influence. Therefore, I was unable to extend knowledge regarding this variable. 
Although not found to be significant by Bolger (2014), my findings provide the 
first indication of other significant factors influencing force outcomes under the New 
Jersey policy paradigm. The data reflected that increasing officer tenure is directly 
correlated with increased mechanical force. Advancing suspect age is inversely related to 
the use of mechanical force. 
A final observation about my results concerns the 14 cases identified as 
studentized residuals. These cases involved instances where suspects offered passive 
resistance (10 cases) and active resistance (four cases). In all cases, officers responded to 
the posed resistance with mechanical force using chemical spray in 11 of these cases, 
baton strikes in two, and a K-9 in one. In the 10 cases of passive resistance, the officers’ 
lawfully chose not to respond with physical force but instead used the next higher level of 
force, mechanical force. I have no other data to help further analyze these cases but they 
do offer at least two possibilities. These observations might reflect lawful but awful force 
where the force used was in compliance with policy but may give rise to the potential for 
excessiveness. They may also represent officers’ sound judgment in fulfilling their 
official duties by choosing to minimize the potential for injuries to the suspects and 
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themselves, particularly in the instances where chemical sprays (e.g., oleoresin capsicum 
[OC spray]) were used. Using chemical sprays has been found to quickly incapacitate 
suspects and is associated with lower rates or injury to both suspects and officers (see 
Smith et al., 2010). However, more data are needed to draw conclusions. 
My research does allow for more than a simple comparison to prior research. The 
experience of collecting and analyzing the data are relevant to the context of my 
theoretical framework, Lipsky’s SLBT. My study generated three types of findings 
relative to this theory. The first relates to my experience utilizing the OPRA law to 
collect data for municipalities. The second involved the auditing of police actions through 
paperwork. The third related to the supervision of officers. 
Lipsky (2010) theorized that SLBs resist controls over their discretion because 
their priorities differ from their managers. They exercise their discretion in a manner 
consistent with their preferences to minimize real dangers and discomforts. In this study, 
I exercised my right as a citizen to oversee the function of police agencies and their 
employees through the use the New Jersey OPRA law. My requests were met with the 
several difficulties explained in Chapter 4. One reason might be that the collection of 
police use of force data during this difficult period in history might have posed a 
subjective degree of danger and discomfort to the municipal clerk or other municipal 
personnel. I received several unlawful responses to my requests that required me to make 
calls and send emails explaining my familiarity with statute and case law before I 
received my requested records. In a small number of cases, I had to retain the services of 
a lawyer. While these actions resolved several of my data collection problems, I still had 
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not received all the information that I requested.  Lipsky’s notion that SLBs resist 
controls over their discretion is supported by my data collection experience.  
Lipsky (2010) further theorized that SLBs use of discretion is not unrestrained by 
rules or directives, but that such efforts achieve limited success when not supported by 
significant sanctions to help achieve desired behaviors. The New Jersey OPRA law offers 
sanctions but the degree of their usefulness is questionable. The New Jersey OPRA law 
provides for escalating monetary penalties to be assessed to any public official who 
knowingly or willfully violates the provisions of the law (N.J. Stat. Ann. 47:1A-11). It 
also allows for the recovery of reasonable attorney fees by the requestor should the 
requestor prevail in court (N.J. Stat. Ann. 47:1A-6). There may also be additional 
sanctions offered by municipal governments, but I did pose that question during my data 
collection. Based on my data collection experience, the sanctions provided in the OPRA 
law do not serve as a sufficient deterrent to prevent violations of the law. Circumstantial 
evidence might endorse the conclusion that the clerks’ or supporting public officials 
ignored the potential fines and knowingly and willfully provided intentionally unlawful 
responses to my requests. Still, this is only one possibility, and the burden of proof to 
buttress this conclusion is high. Another and perhaps more likely possibility is that the 
clerks and supporting public officials were not sufficiently trained on the operation of the 
OPRA law and that the risk of paying court assessed legal fees is preferable to municipal 
leaders than the actual cost of training personnel to ensure the correct application of the 
law. Whatever the actual motivations were that complicated my data collection, the 
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sanctions enumerated in the OPRA law do not compel complete compliance with the law 
and support Lipsky’s belief that insignificant sanctions do not restrain SLB discretion. 
Lipsky (2010) explained that the auditing of SLB behaviors is complicated when 
SLBs complete paperwork in a way that guards against later adverse inspection. Through 
various methods, SLBs can capitalize on weaknesses inherent with insufficient 
supervision to maintain control of their work despite the controls applied by 
management. This notion was grossly apparent in the force reporting forms I collected. 
Officers commonly submitted incomplete forms. These omissions limited my ability to 
examine officer variables and ultimately altered my original research and analysis plan. 
Were it not for the Asbury Park Press’s Data Universe (http://php.app.com/agent/), which 
reports publicly available pension data, I would have lost the ability to include any officer 
variables in my study. While I cannot conclude that officers willfully omitted information 
from their reports, my study does support Lipsky’s (2010) assertion about auditing of 
SLB behaviors through paperwork.  
The New Jersey RIP directive and Use of Force guideline do conform with 
Lipsky’s (2010) need for rules to be clear, unambiguous, and supported by significant 
sanctions. The New Jersey RIP directive is an explicit and unequivocal order to all police 
officers in the state forbidding the use of race as a factor in their discretionary actions. 
The Use of Force guideline is slightly ambiguous because it is impossible to create an 
algorithm addressing all possible scenarios an officer might face. Instead, the Use of 
Force guideline provides defined limits that can be applied to all scenarios given the 
totality of the circumstances faced by the officer. Both the RIP directive and Use of Force 
134 
 
guideline follow the Davis (1969, 1975) model for confining, structuring, and checking 
officer behavior. They are supported by disciplinary processes subjecting violative 
officers to agency sanction, criminal prosecution, and civil litigation under state 
administrative, criminal, and tort laws; and under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. They are also 
supported by laws that subject agencies permitting the existence of a pattern or practice 
of violations to litigation from the U.S. Attorney General under 42 U.S.C. § 14141 and 
civil litigation for municipal liability under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Sufficient supervision is 
the obvious requirement to make both these rules work as devised. 
Lipsky (2010) argued that when supervision is minimal, the evaluation of SLBs 
becomes difficult as supervisors are unable to directly observe the intangible factors 
leading to SLB decisions. This notion is true, especially in policing, because most 
officers work with little direct supervision. Still, extant research shows that it is possible 
to examine force outcomes for intangible factors used in officer decisions through data 
analysis. Despite my inability to directly observe the actions of these officers, I was able 
to provide a degree of supervision by examining their force reporting forms. I discovered 
that even during the period when the RIP directive was not promulgated, officers still 
provided equal protection to all citizens from unlawful force. 
Ultimately, my observations during the data collection process support some of 
Lipsky’s (2010) conclusions regarding the operation of the OPRA law. However, my data 
analysis of the force used by police officers did not uncover evidence of Lipsky’s 
theorized coping mechanisms reflecting racial bias. 
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Limitations of the Study 
My retrospective quantitative nonexperimental study suffered from limitations, 
particularly those of effectively denied access, a relatively small sample size, and a lack 
of available data. These limitations affected my analysis. As a result, they affected my 
findings and conclusions. 
I had expected to receive all the data I requested, given the published records 
retention schedule defined by the New Jersey Division of Archives and Records 
Management and the right to access legislated in the OPRA law. For this reason, 
combined with issues of practicality and avoidance of extensive travel throughout the 
state, I elected to examine only one county. Unfortunately, by the end of my study, I had 
not received data from one third of those agencies from which I had made a request. As 
such, I collected no instances of deadly force used by officers, leaving me to examine 
only physical and mechanical force. 
I did not expect to discover agencies had promulgated a RIP directive before the 
state’s mandate in 2005. While this discovery indicates a positive social and political step 
on the part of those agencies, it forced me to exclude them from my examination and 
reduced my sample size. This did not prevent me from finding significant results, but 
when combined with the issue of limited data, it did prevent me from fully exploring the 
complete set of variables present in the force reporting forms. 
I expected to find instances of incomplete forms but had not imagined that I 
would have encountered so many of them. The number of incomplete reports left me with 
far too few observations of officer characteristics to analyze. As a result, I had to drop 
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several officer characteristic variables that had been demonstrated in prior literature to be 
an important factor in force use.  
Included in the limitation described above was the lack of data regarding officer 
gender. I overcame this limitation by using the putative sound of the reporting officers’ 
names listed on the reports. In very few instances were the names androgynous. 
However, the sample did not generate enough female officers for analysis, and the 
variable was dropped from examination. 
Despite the identified limitations, my study involved observations that were not 
complicated by artificial laboratory environments or testing effects, and which were 
selected for analysis using a stratified random sample. Typical validity threats present in 
experimental testing were not present here, except for the maturation of the officers over 
the 10 years examined. The method of collecting data was consistent throughout this 
period. Therefore, the results of this study are valid, reliable, and trustworthy. Still, given 
the small sample size, great caution should be exercised in generalizing the results 
beyond the sample. 
Recommendations 
My research used data collected from one New Jersey county to determine how 
the New Jersey RIP directive affected municipal police officer uses of force on non-
Whites after its implementation. Future research seeking to more broadly examine this 
influence should not be as limited and should include data collected from multiple 
municipalities across the state. However, researchers should be cautious in extending the 
timeframe from that found in this study and should do so only after thorough 
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consideration of the policy nuances present during those added periods. Careful attention 
should be paid to data collection and development of the sample.  
I recommend that future researchers collect data in two parts, starting with OPRA 
requests for the relevant policies and aggregate reporting made to the county prosecutor 
followed by requests for the use of force reports. These requests should be directed to the 
clerks of a stratified proportionate random sample of municipalities representing the full 
range of socioeconomic and urban-rural classifications present in the state, as well as, the 
range of small, medium, and large police departments found here. The first part of the 
data collection would allow the researchers to discover anomalous agencies that 
promulgated their own RIP directives prior to the state and adjust their sample or 
statistical method. It would also offer insight into the degree of cooperation they can 
expect to receive from those municipalities prior to the second part, the OPRA requests 
for the use of force reports. The initial request would also provide an opportunity to 
develop a concrete sampling frame prior to the second OPRA request for the use of force 
reports, provided that the agencies retained their aggregate reports and correctly reported 
the force used by officers. The second request may expose the researchers to the potential 
for the difficulties present in my study, so the experiences found in the first request may 
help the researcher prepare for those difficulties.  
While the OPRA law indicates that complete data collection should occur in an 
expeditious fashion, the reality did not live up to that expectation. I recommend that 
researchers be prepared to keep their data collection period open for several months and 
have a prepared cash reserve to pay special service charges. It would also be useful to 
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have an attorney who specializes in the OPRA law to help prepare and follow-up with the 
OPRA requests. 
Unlike this study, future researchers examining a larger area of the state would 
inevitably collect the complete range of force options available to officers and lead to 
greater statistical scrutiny. Binomial logistic regression would not be sufficient to analyze 
data with more force options. Prior researchers have used ordered probit to analyze a 
larger number of force options with sufficient observations. However, Terrill et al. (2008) 
found that when analyzing force data, the suspect race variable could be statistically 
insignificant in an ordered probit analysis but statistically significant in a hierarchical 
logistic model. Therefore, after collecting their data, researchers should consult with their 
statistical advisors to derive the most appropriate statistical method for use in their study. 
I also recommend conducting similar studies in different locations. The 
promulgation of RIP directives is still a relatively new practice in the police enterprise. 
Where force reporting forms are publicly available, researchers presently have better 
opportunities to collect data than they might in the future before records are archived, 
lost, or destroyed, and perhaps before public access is restricted. Researchers conducting 
similar studies in other states should also be prepared to have extended collection periods, 
reserved funds to pay special service fees, and to enlist the help of an attorney 
knowledgeable in the applicable laws concerning public access to government records. 
Future research, either in New Jersey of elsewhere, would greatly benefit from 
contrasting these force incidents against the total number of police-citizen encounters. 
Currently, in New Jersey, there is no mandated or consistent method among agencies 
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regarding how these incidents are logged. Overcoming this challenge would likely 
require an agreement with the police agencies being studied so that archival data can be 
accessed and non-encounters properly eliminated from the comparison (e.g., perimeter 
checks of local businesses for attempted or completed burglaries). 
Finally, while I sought to examine the influence of a rule on police uses of force, 
the nature of police use of force itself was necessarily examined. The literature review 
uncovered problems with the operationalization and conceptualization of force across the 
scholarly realm, which did not adequately reflect the phenomena or its interaction with 
policy in the field. Future force studies should bridge this scholar-practitioner divide. 
Also, better instrumentation that collects suspect, officer, encounter, neighborhood, and 
organizational characteristics is needed to leverage research and networks that influence 
force policies. Instrumentation should be developed through community-based research 
practices that reflect community needs and the needs of public policymakers so future 
research findings can better serve the community, police, policymakers, and scholars.  
Implications for Positive Social Change 
Walden University requires that doctoral students explore how their research can 
impact positive social change. I sought to create social change by contributing context 
and empirical evidence to the discussion of the public’s trust in the police by examining 
the force phenomena and its relationship to a public policy guaranteeing equal protection 
to all people. I intended my research to illustrate how previous research has treated the 
phenomenon and how future research could better aid civilians, police leaders, and 
policymakers in advancing evidence-based public policy. I also intended my research to 
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show civilians how they can collect records under the authority of an open public records 
law and thoughtfully examine the data to prevail over diminished government 
transparency where these data are not regularly published in the public domain.  
My study contributes to social change on a broad scale by alerting civilians, 
police practitioners, public policymakers, and scholars to the troubles inherent in their 
communications between and among themselves and the role this communication plays 
in the distrust of the police. Current discussions and scholarly research are muddled by 
basic conceptions that widely differ and by insufficient concrete relatable data. In 
providing a commentary about the largely uncertain extent of the phenomenon, opaque 
conceptualizations, and the current state of research, this dissertation can bolster police 
legitimacy and improve trust between the public and police by serving as a primer to 
begin greater and clearer discourse, and serve as the starting point on the map leading to 
studies better capable of informing the public, police practitioners, and policymakers 
during their pursuit of just and effective public policies. 
My study contributes to social change in New Jersey by offering to police 
practitioners and policymakers the first known analysis of the interaction between two 
policies that influence officer uses of force and impact the trust between the public and 
police. It illustrates areas in policy requiring improvement but serves as testimony to 
government officials of the value of examining their records as a regular method to detect 
and resolve disparate treatment of minority populations and to discover positive findings 
that inspire trust in the police and strengthen legitimacy. These findings contained herein 
demonstrate that this sample of officers made race-neutral force decisions contrary to 
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opinions presented in national surveys and serve as an affirmation of their dependability 
to use force appropriately. Despite these findings public trust in police remains low 
revealing that deeper issues must exist and indicates to New Jersey police practitioners 
and policymakers that additional efforts are needed to uncover and rectify issues affecting 
the problems of public trust in the police and police legitimacy. 
Perhaps the largest contribution that my study makes to social change is by 
serving as an exemplar that civilians can use to regularly conduct and maintain oversight 
of their police agencies. By taking advantage of their rights under open public record 
laws, civilians can obtain access to reports not normally published by police agencies so 
that they may evaluate the actions of officers. Vigilance of this nature increases the 
transparency of police agencies and improves police accountability by putting police on 
notice that civilians intend to enforce the social contract between them for the provision 
of equal protection and security. Also, increased civilian awareness and regular use of 
these laws will serve to challenge future administrative and legislative efforts that may 
seek to reduce the scope or power of these laws.  
Conclusion 
The President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing (2015) has acknowledged the 
problem of trust between the community and the police and recommended that police 
agencies throughout the nation institute policies outlawing the practice of RIP while 
citing only anecdotal evidence of its value. The experiences of New Jersey municipal 
police officers afforded an opportunity to examine the value of such a rule. My 
examination uncovered no confirmation of biased-based force use in this sample. Officers 
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have maintained a policy of using force in a race-neutral manner. Notwithstanding my 
results, the promulgation and enforcement of policies outlawing the practice of RIP is a 
practical initial step to ensuring the equal protection of all people and clearly and 
profoundly demonstrates the government’s willingness to hold police accountable for 
unlawful acts and to treat everyone equally. 
In hopes of contributing to positive social change, I examined the use of force by 
municipal police officers in one New Jersey county to determine if an administrative rule 
could prevent RIP. My results do not provide evidence that administrative rules prevent 
RIP and may raise questions regarding the need for these policies. However, this was the 
first study of its kind and used a small sample with a limited number of variables. Thus, 
this study should serve as a call to action for civilians, practitioners, policymakers, and 
researchers to examine this topic elsewhere so that their findings may help influence 
public policies that enhance public trust in the police and strengthen police legitimacy. 
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